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REASSESSING THE PURPOSES OF 
FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION 
John F. Preis* 
For ages, judges and legal academics have claimed that 
federal question jurisdiction has three purposes: to provide 
litigants with a judge experienced in federal law, to protect 
litigants from state court hostility toward federal claims, and to 
preserve uniformity in federal law. Because federal claims, for 
the most part, have always been cognizable in state courts, 
these purposes imply that state courts are less experienced, 
more hostile, and more likely to adjudicate federal law in ways 
that decrease the uniformity of federal law. Despite the ongoing 
allegiance to this conception of federal question jurisdiction-
and by implication, state court adjudication of federal 
questions--0ne would be hard-pressed to find much research 
assessing the performance of state courts in these areas. 
This Article explores these issues by relying on a fifteen-state 
study of state civil opinions resolving federal questions. The 
study reveals several reasons to doubt the claim that state court 
adjudication of federal law will automatically decrease the 
uniformity of federal law. In contrast, the study suggests that 
federal courts are indeed more experienced in federal law, 
though their comparative experience is not uniform across all 
areas of federal law. With regard to the presumed hostility of 
state courts toward federal claims, this Article joins other 
scholars in questioning whether such a thesis may ever be 
reliably employed in the federal courts field. 
After addressing the three presumed purposes of federal 
question jurisdiction, the Article identifies an additional 
purpose that is rarely acknowledged in scholarship on the 
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. J.D., 
Vanderbilt University School of Law; B.S., Cornell University. This Article 
benefited greatly from discussions with Jim Concannon, Alex Glashausser, Bill 
Rich, and Michael Solimine. In addition, Paul Hendrix, Andrew Parmenter, 
and David Schreiber provided valuable research assistance throughout the 
project. 
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subject. That is, federal question jurisdiction promotes the 
federal government's sovereignty interests by allowing it to 
control the content of federal law. Without federal question 
jurisdiction, the federal government would only be able to 
control the interpretation of federal law through Supreme 
Court review of state decisions, which is quite limited in 
practice. 
After defining the role of federal question jurisdiction as one 
of experience and control, the Article concludes by briefiy 
discussing the impact of these findings on the jurisdictional 
questions faced by courts and Congress. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court believes that federal question jurisdiction 
has three purposes: (1) to provide litigants with judges more 
"experience[d]" in federal law than state judges, (2) to provide 
litigants with judges more "solicit[ous]" of federal claims than state 
judges, and (3) to promote the "uniformO" interpretation of federal 
law which would suffer if interpreted chiefly in the state courts. 1 
1. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 545 U.S. 
308, 312 (2005). The precise issue in the case was whether a state law quiet-
title action, the resolution of which hinged on the meaning of federal tax law, 
could be heard in federal court under federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 
1331). The Court unanimously held that the case did "arise under" federal law 
for the purposes of federal question jurisdiction. Eight justices joined in a 
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Just about everybody else seems to believe this, too.2 There is a 
problem with this, however: we know very little about state court 
behavior in adjudicating federal questions. 
This Article aims to provide a better understanding of how state 
courts decide federal questions and, in doing so, suggests that the 
presumed purposes of federal question jurisdiction may be 
overstated or even unjustified altogether. With regard to the claim 
that federal question jurisdiction promotes uniformity, the Article, 
in Part III, points to many factors that suggest that state court 
adjudication of federal questions may have little effect on the 
uniformity of federal law. In Part IV, relying on a study of state 
civil opinions published in fifteen different states, the Article 
concludes that state courts do in fact have significant experience in 
certain areas of federal law, though their experience with federal 
statutes is particularly weak compared to the federal judiciary. 
Turning in Part V to the claim that federal courts are more 
solicitous of federal claims than state courts, the Article joins other 
scholars in arguing that the current research in this area is 
insufficient to support a uniform presumption that federal courts 
will, on average, exceed state courts in their solicitude for federal 
claims. After addressing these three presumed purposes, the Article 
introduces in Part VI a typically unrecognized purpose of federal 
question jurisdiction: the promotion of the federal government's 
sovereignty interests. Providing the federal courts jurisdiction to 
hear roughly 160,000 federal claims each year, the federal question 
statute is a major way that the federal government can control the 
content of federal law.3 Although the federal courts thus hear large 
majority opinion that looked to the three presumed purposes of federal question 
jurisdiction to resolve the issue. Justice Thomas authored a short, two-page 
concurring opinion in which he argued that, although the majority reached the 
proper conclusion, it should have relied on a bright-line rule rather than a 
balancing test. Thomas did not voice, however, any disagreement with the 
majority's enunciation of the principles of experience, uniformity, and 
solicitude. See id. at 320 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
2. See infra notes 9-25 and accompanying text. 
3. While scholars and judges often speak of sovereignty in discussing 
federal courts' role, Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of 
the Federal Courts, 1990 BYU L. REV. 67, 80-81; Barry Friedman, Under the 
Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State 
Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1226 (2004), sovereignty is rarely given a role 
in federal question jurisdiction in particular. Tellingly, the American Law 
Institute's landmark study of federal jurisdiction-which was authored by some 
of the most eminent scholars in the field-adopted the three-part description 
noted supra and did not address any sovereignty concerns. AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS 164-65 (1969). 
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numbers of claims under the federal question statute, the Article 
makes clear in Part VII that the jurisdictional grant does not likely 
shield states from a significant caseload burden. State courts could 
likely absorb federal question cases without suffering significant 
institutional problems. After elucidating the purposes of federal 
question jurisdiction, the Article briefly considers in Part VIII the 
doctrinal import of the purposes in certain areas of federal 
jurisdiction. Part IX then ends the Article with a short conclusion. 
II. THE PREVAILING BELIEFS 
Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution places 
within the "judicial power" of the federal courts "all Cases, in Law 
and Equity, arising under th[e] Constitution, the Laws of the United 
States, and Treaties made ... under their Authority.',4 This grant of 
judicial power is largely implemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which 
employs language nearly identical to that used in Article III.5 The 
primary impact of this statute is to make federal courts available to 
adjudicate federal questions. This Part explains the three purposes 
scholars and jurists attribute to such jurisdiction: the preservation 
of uniformity in federal law, the provision of a forum hospitable to 
federal law, and the provision of a judge likely to have experience in 
federal law.6 
Before discussing the prevailing beliefs, however, it is important 
to note that § 1331 is just one way that federal courts obtain 
jurisdiction over federal claims. A number of federal statutes 
contain their own jurisdictional provisions such that, even if§ 1331 
were removed from the U.S. Code, these claims could still be 
Moreover, even when scholars discuss sovereignty interests in the context 
of the federal courts, they typically fail to distinguish between the different 
types of sovereignty interests-which include controlling sovereign law and 
having the right to litigate in sovereign courts. This Article recognizes that the 
distinction is important and should be accounted for in federal question 
doctrine. 
4. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2. 
5. Section 1331 provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties 
of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
6. For clarity's sake, I present the three purposes separately. This risks 
implying that some courts and scholars subscribe to some of the three purposes 
but not all of them as a package. This is not the case. The three-part 
conception of federal jurisdiction is dominant in the judiciary and the academy. 
This is perhaps best exemplified by the Supreme Court's most recent 
pronouncement in Grable, 545 U.S. at 312, as well as the American Law 
Institute's statement-written by the top scholars in the field at that point-
that the jurisdictional grant serves these three goals. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 
supra note 3, at 164-65. 
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brought in federal court. 7 While the current scope of federal 
question jurisdiction is thus a product of § 1331, as well as 
numerous particular jurisdictional grants, it is still possible to speak 
of federal question jurisdiction as a coherent whole. The arguments 
advanced in favor of federal question jurisdiction do not hinge on 
whether the grant is accomplished on a statute-by-statute basis or 
globally with a single statute. Indeed, two of the three beliefs about 
the need for federal question jurisdiction predate the creation of 
general federal question jurisdiction by almost a century.8 Thus, 
while this Article often refers to"§ 1331" as a figurehead of federal 
question jurisdiction, one should note that the true federal question 
jurisdiction is accomplished by § 1331 and many jurisdictional 
provisions in other pieces of legislation. 
A. Uniformity 
In Federalist No. 80, Alexander Hamilton explained why federal 
courts must be available to adjudicate federal law. "The mere 
necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws," 
he explained, "decides the question. Thirteen independent courts of 
final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, 
is a hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and 
confusion can proceed."9 
In the centuries since Hamilton voiced this view, countless 
jurists10 and scholars11 have concurred. Moreover, the notion retains 
7. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000) (permitting civil claimants to sue in 
federal court); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2000) (permitting federal courts to 
adjudicate civil actions "brought under" Title VII). 
8. These are the uniformity and solicitude beliefs. See infra notes 9-12 & 
18-25 and accompanying text. 
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961). 
10. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 293 (1997) (stating 
that federal interpretation of federal law is a "means of serving a federal 
interest in uniformity"); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 
383 (1996) (explaining that, in the context of exclusive federal jurisdiction over 
federal securities actions, the only extant purpose is "to achieve greater 
uniformity of construction and more effective and expert application of that 
law"); Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 348-49 (1994) (explaining that federal 
jurisdiction is important to creating a "nationally uniform interpretation"); 
Taffiin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 464 (1990) (noting in the context of exclusive 
federal jurisdiction that interpretation of federal law by a limited number of 
courts promotes the "desirability of uniform interpretation"); Chick Kam Choo 
v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 151 (1988) (White, J., concurring) (stating that 
the "federal interest in uniformity" may require the case be heard in federal 
court); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826 (1986) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that one of the "reasons Congress found it 
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necessary to add [federal question) jurisdiction to the district courts" is "the 
importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole 
United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution") 
(quoting Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816)) 
(emphasis in original); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 256 
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that an "essential function of the 
federal courts" is to "provide a fair and impartial forum for the uniform 
interpretation and enforcement of the supreme law of the land"); Gulf Offshore 
Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 483-84 (1981) (stating in the context of 
exclusive federal jurisdiction that "desirability of uniform interpretation" is an 
interest advanced by the jurisdictional grant); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
475, 514 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the grant of federal 
jurisdiction was "designed" to "achieve greater uniformity of results") (citing 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816)); Brown v. 
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 541 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting in the habeas 
jurisdiction context that, because the "uniformity of federal law [is] attainable 
only by a centralized source of authority, denial by a state of a claimed federal 
right must give some access to the federal judicial system"). 
11. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 3, at 165-66 ("There is reason to 
believe ... that greater uniformity results from hearing [federal question) cases 
in a federal court."); ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION§ 5.2.1, at 265 
(2d ed. 1994) ("Another frequently offered justification for federal question 
jurisdiction is the need to ensure uniformity in the interpretation of federal 
law."); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION 
OF JUDICIAL POWER 101 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that "precedential confusion [will 
be) caused by the dramatic increase in the number of interpreting courts"); 
Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble with Federal Question Jurisdiction 
After Merrell Dow, 52 Omo ST. L.J. 1477, 1496 (1991) (noting that federal 
question jurisdiction provides the "the potential for uniform interpretation of 
federal law"); Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 3, at 83-85 (asserting that 
federal jurisdiction of some sort is necessary to assure the "uniform 
interpretation and application of federal law"); Christopher A. Cotropia, 
Counterclaims, the Well-Pleaded Complaint, and Federal Jurisdiction, 33 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 39 (2004) (stating that one of "the purposes behind federal 
question jurisdiction" is the "goal of uniformity"); Donald L. Doernberg, There's 
No Reason For It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule 
Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 
647 (1987) (finding that federal question jurisdiction exists in part out of "the 
need for uniformity in [the] interpretation and application [of federal law]"); 
Friedman, supra note 3, at 1241 (stating that state court adjudication offederal 
law will create "disuniformity," which is a "serious problemO"); Jeffrey W. 
Grove, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century: 
A Response to Professor Solimine, 35 IND. L. REV. 365, 366 (2002) ("In my 
judgment, uniformity-or at least an increased potential for uniformity of 
federal law-is a value of the first rank."); Thomas B. Marvell, The Rationales 
for Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Empirical Examination of Student Rights 
Litigation, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1315, 1335 (1984) (noting uniformity as one of four 
rationales for federal question jurisdiction); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal 
"Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 158 (1953) (explaining 
that the existence of the federal courts' is important to "achieving widespread, 
uniform effectuation of federal law" given that the Supreme Court actually 
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its currency today. As noted in the Introduction, the Supreme Court 
in 2005 continued this tradition by stating that § 1331 jurisdiction 
provides a ''hope of uniformity" in the interpretation of federal law .12 
B. Experience 
While the uniformity rationale originated early on in the 
republic, the notion that federal question jurisdiction provides 
litigants with judges experienced in federal law is much newer. 
Nonetheless, it is just as strongly established as other putative 
purposes of the jurisdictional grant. In describing the role federal 
question jurisdiction plays in the national judicial order, the 
American Law Institute explained in its Study of the Division of 
Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts that "[t]he federal 
courts have acquired a considerable expertness in the interpretation 
and application of federal law."13 State courts, by contrast, have 
much less expertise because "federal question cases must form a 
very small part of the business of [state] courts."14 "As a result, the 
federal courts are comparatively more skilled at interpreting and 
applying federal law, and are much more likely correctly to divine 
Congress's intent in enacting legislation."15 One need not look hard 
to find numerous courts16 and scholars17 who subscribe to this view. 
decides relatively few cases); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory Of 
Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 290 (2005); Eric J. Segall, Article 
III As A Grant Of Power: Protective Jurisdiction, Federalism and the Federal 
Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 361, 392 (2002) (stating that "federal jurisdiction was 
always intended to be instrumental" and that one of its goals is to "promote the 
uniformity and supremacy of federal law"). 
12. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 545 U.S. 
308, 312 (2005). 
13. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 3, at 164-65. 
14. Id. at 165. 
15. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 827 (1986) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
16. U.S. v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 464 n.11 (1988) (noting that, because the 
Federal Circuit focuses only on a single subject matter, it "brings to the cases 
before it an unusual expertise"); Merrell Dow Pharms., 478 U.S. at 826 (stating 
that § 1331 provides litigants with a "forum that specializes in federal law and 
that is therefore more likely to apply that law correctly"); Gulf Offshore Co. v. 
Mobil Oil Co., 453 U.S. 473, 484 (1981) (noting the "expertise of federal judges 
in federal law"); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 514 (1973) (explaining that 
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1331 "to preserve and enhance the expertise of 
federal courts in applying federal law"); Medema v. Medema Builders, Inc., 854 
F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that exclusive federal jurisdiction 
"cultivate[s] [federal] uniformity and expertise"); Winningham v. U. S. Dep't of 
Haus. & Urban Dev., 512 F.2d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Federal jurisdiction 
over actions arising under acts of Congress governing the conduct of federal 
officials [should be decided by federal] tribunals which have acquired experience 
254 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
C. Solicitude 
Like the belief in uniformity, the belief that federal courts are 
more solicitous of federal claims than state courts (or conversely 
that state courts are more hostile to federal claims than federal 
courts) can be traced back to Alexander Hamilton.18 Speaking on the 
issue, Hamilton explained: 
What, for instance, would avail restrictions on the authority of 
the state legislatures, without some constitutional mode of 
enforcing the observance of them? The states, by the plan of 
the convention, are prohibited from doing a variety of things; 
some of which are incompatible with the interests of the union, 
and others with the principles of good government. The 
imposition of duties on imported articles, and the emission of 
paper money, are specimens of each kind. No man of sense will 
believe, that such prohibitions would be scrupulously 
and expertise in dealing with national legislation."); see also S. REP. No. 1507 
(1966) ("Additionally, the Federal courts have more expertise in deciding 
questions involving treaties with the Federal Government, as well as 
interpreting the relevant body of Federal law that has developed over the 
years."). 
17. As Professor Redish has put it: 
[F]ederal courts have developed a vast expertise in dealing with the 
intricacies of federal law, while the state judiciary has, quite 
naturally, devoted the bulk of its efforts to the evolution and 
refinement of state law and policy. It would be unreasonable to expect 
state judiciaries to possess a facility equal to that of the federal courts 
in adjudicating federal law. 
REDISH, supra note 11, at 2; see also Alleva, supra note 11, at 1495 (stating that 
§ 1331 takes advantage of federal courts' "expertise in discerning and 
interpreting federal interests"); Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: 
Restoring A Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (2003) ("We are 
federal judges, we have more knowledge of federal law. You are state judges, 
you have more knowledge of state law. Let each of us do our job and not be 
insulted."); Friedman, supra note 3, 1236-37; Alan D. Hornstein, Federalism, 
Judicial Power and the "Arising Under" Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A 
Hierarchial Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 563, 564-65 (1981) (stating that state court 
adjudications of federal law carry a higher risk of "error"); Philip B. Kurland, 
Toward a Co-Operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention 
Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 487 (1960) ("I start with the principle that the federal 
courts are the primary experts on national law just as the state courts are the 
final expositors of the laws of their respective jurisdictions."); Marvell, supra 
note 11, at 1333-34 (citing numerous sources for the proposition that "federal 
judges have much more expertise in deciding issues involving federal law 
matters than do state judges"). 
18. I use the terms "federal solicitude" and "state hostility" interchangeably 
in this Article. While the Supreme Court often speaks euphemistically of 
"federal solicitude," scholars tend to more bluntly speak of"state hostility." See, 
e.g., Hornstein, supra note 17, at 564-65 (stating that federal question 
jurisdiction avoids the risk of"state hostility" to federal interests). 
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regarded, without some effectual power in the government to 
restrain or correct the infractions of them. 19 
This view was echoed in the seminal case on federal question 
jurisdiction, Osborn v. Bank of the United States, where Chief 
Justice Marshall fielded arguments by legal luminaries Daniel 
Webster and Henry Clay. Arguing that the state law claim at issue 
in the case "arose under" federal law, the two asserted that "the 
constitution itself supposes that [the state courts] may not always be 
worthy of confidence, where the rights and interests of the national 
government are drawn in question."20 While Chief Justice Marshall 
did not overtly cite this position in siding with Webster and Clay, it 
is strongly believed that it figured prominently in the Court's 
decision. 21 
Since that time, and emboldened by the events of the Civil War 
and Reconstruction, 22 the belief in federal solicitude towards federal 
claims has persisted in both judicial23 and academic24 writings and 
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961). 
20. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 811 (1824). 
21. The role of state hostility is revealed most obviously in Justice 
Johnson's dissent in Osborn itself. See id. at 871-72 (Johnson, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the "policy of the decision is obvious," namely to "render[] all the 
protection necessary, that the general government can give to this Bank"). 
Years later, Justice Frankfurter made the same observation. See Textile 
Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 481 (1957) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting) ("Marshall's holding [in Osborn] was undoubtedly influenced by 
his fear that the bank might suffer hostile treatment in the state courts that 
could not be remedied by an appeal on an isolated federal question."); see also 
James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power 
of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 714 n.314 (2004) ("Osborn itself 
grew out of a perception that federal instrumentalities may need protection 
from hostile state officers and state court judges who would otherwise 
adjudicate common law claims."). 
22. See Marvell, supra note 11, at 1331-33. 
23. Merrell Dow Pharms., 487 U.S. at 827 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
("Another reason Congress conferred original federal-question jurisdiction on 
the district courts was its belief that state courts are hostile to assertions of 
federal rights."); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 517-18 (1858) (stating that 
"local tribunals [adjudicating federal claims] could hardly be expected to be 
always free from the local influences"). Another clue to the "sympathy" purpose 
behind federal question jurisdiction is the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, enacted 
just four years prior to the general federal question statute. The Supreme 
Court has twice analyzed the federal jurisdictional provisions of the Ku Klux 
Klan Act (which is more commonly known as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 today) and 
concluded that a motivating force behind the jurisdictional grant was a mistrust 
of state, as compared to federal, authorities. 
A major factor motivating the expansion of federal jurisdiction 
through §§ 1 and 2 of the [Ku Klux Klan Act] was the belief of the 
256 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 2005.25 
III. UNIFORMITY 
The belief that federal question jurisdiction maintains 
uniformity in federal law is based on the supposition that, as the 
number of decisionmakers increases, the variability of final 
decisions will increase as well. In many respects, this supposition is 
entirely logical. For instance, if one asked fifty random people on 
the street to name their "personal hero," nearly fifty different 
answers would likely be generated. If the same question was then 
posed to 100 people, the variability of responses would almost 
certainly increase, resulting in something close to 100 different 
responses. Thus, in this example, as the number of decisionmakers 
doubles, the variability of decisions will likely double (or nearly 
double). 
Were this the type of question regularly adjudicated in federal 
courts, one could reasonably expect state court adjudication of 
federal questions to increase the variability in federal law. Of 
1871 Congress that the state authorities had been unable or unwilling 
to protect the constitutional rights of individuals or to punish those 
who violated these rights. 
Patsy v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 505 (1982); see also Mitchum v. 
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240-42 (1972) ("The very purpose of § 1983 was to 
interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of 
the people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action 
under color of state law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or 
judicial.'") (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)). 
24. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 3, at 166 (noting the "lack of 
sympathy" that federal claimants might encounter in state courts); REDISH, 
supra note 11, at 83 (stating, in the context offederal question jurisdiction, that 
"federal judges may often be more sympathetic to federal interests than are 
many state judges"); Alleva, supra note 11, at 1495-96 (noting that federal 
question jurisdiction makes us of federal courts' "sympathetic, but respectful, 
national perspective"); David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American 
Law Institute, Part I, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1968) ("Because of persistent 
state-federal hostilities ... we do not seem to have reached the point where 
Supreme Court review of state courts is always adequate to assure recognition 
of federal rights."); Hornstein, supra note 1 7, at 564-65 (stating that states may 
be "provincialD" with respect to federal rights); Marvell, supra note 11, at 1330 
(noting that the "reason most commonly cited for both federal court jurisdiction 
in article III" is that "federal judges are more likely to uphold federal law 
because they are more sympathetic to federally protected rights than state 
judges"); Mishkin, supra note 11, at 158 (noting that federal courts are more 
likely to give a "sympathetic treatment of Supreme Court precedents" than 
their "state counterparts"). 
25. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 545 U.S. 
308, 314 (2005). 
2007] REASSESSING FEDERAL JURISDICTION 257 
course, this question is not the stuff of adjudication. Nor does the 
way in which respondents determine their answers resemble the 
methods of legal reasoning employed by courts. As explained infra, 
it is improper to automatically assume that state court adjudication 
of federal questions-at their current or a moderately increased 
level26-is certain to increase disuniformity in federal law because 
(1) the nature of many legal questions sharply limits the variety of 
permissible answers, (2) norms of state court judging impose 
meaningful constraints on the variety of answers judges will select, 
and (3) the precedential effect of state federal-law decisions is 
relatively weak.27 Importantly, several or all of these three factors 
are likely operating at the same time, making it quite unlikely that 
state court adjudication-whether at its current or an increased 
level-significantly affects uniformity. Before addressing each of 
these points, however, it is perhaps useful to speak more specifically 
about uniformity in the legal context. 
Those advocating uniformity in the law argue that "federal law 
should mean the same thing regardless of the forum."28 This, 
26. To be clear, this Article does not claim that a wholesale revocation of 
federal jurisdiction would not affect the current level of uniformity in federal 
law. As I explain infra in this Part, state courts rely significantly on federal 
courts for guidance on federal questions. Thus, if federal courts were to 
disappear, state courts, initially at least, would be left without valuable 
guidance on federal law. While it is plausible that, after the initial shock 
caused by the alteration in jurisdiction, state courts would come to rely on each 
other for leadership, such a hypothesis ventures far beyond the empirical 
evidence adduced in this Article. 
27. To my knowledge, no scholar has studied the uniformity of federal law 
as it relates to federal question jurisdiction in any depth. One commentator has 
expressed doubt about the uniformity claims, which is consistent with some of 
the data presented herein. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 
5.2.1, at 263 (3d ed. 1999) ("It is not clear that ninety-four federal judicial 
districts will produce more uniformity than fifty state judiciaries. It might be 
argued that thirteen federal courts of appeals will produce more uniformity 
than fifty state judiciaries. But this conclusion is less obvious than it might 
seem. On a controversial issue, there are likely to be two or three different 
positions adopted among the thirteen federal courts of appeals. Even if all fifty 
state judiciaries consider the issue, there still are likely to be just two or three 
different positions taken on a given legal question."). 
28. Donald L. Beschle, Uniformity in Constitutional Interpretation and the 
Background Right to Effective Democratic Governance, 63 IND. L.J. 539, 539 
(1988). Importantly, this conception of uniformity is distinct from the 
conception of uniformity that speaks to predictability. Take, for example, the 
Federal Circuit's recent patent law jurisprudence. Commentators have 
repeatedly lamented the high reversal rates that have recently manifested 
themselves in certain areas of patent law. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, 
Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005) (reviewing empirical studies of reversal rates 
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however, begs an essential question if one is to evaluate legal 
uniformity in a world of courts and stare decisis: how is one to define 
the "meaning'' of federal law? On one level, this is quite simple. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, applies only to 
employers with "fifteen or more employees."29 If some courts held 
employers with less than fifteen employees liable under Title VII, 
while others only applied the law to employers with fifteen or more 
employees, it could be said that federal law had two different 
"meanings." Contrast this provision of Title VII, however, with 
another of its provisions, this one making it unlawful for an 
employer to "discriminate against any [employee] . . . because of 
such [employee's] ... sex."30 As interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
this provision prohibits employers from subjecting employees to a 
"hostile work environment" based on their sex.31 Suppose one court 
found a workplace "hostile" under Title VII and another court found 
a separate workplace not hostile. Would this indicate that "hostile" 
had two different meanings? 
Of course not. These two examples track the distinction 
between pure questions law and mixed questions of law and fact. 
Pure questions of law-like the employee numerosity requirement-
are directly tied to variability in law; in fact, under the principle of 
stare decisis, answers to pure legal questions are the law. Mixed 
questions of law and fact, however, are different. Such questions 
are those in which "the historical facts are admitted or established, 
the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts 
satisfy the [relevant] statutory standard, or, to put it another way, 
whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is 
not violated."32 Under this view, because the "rule of law is 
undisputed," mixed questions do not produce new "law." 
More realistically, however, one must recognize that mixed 
questions of law, at some level, do make law. If one court finds a 
workplace where sexually suggestive pictures of women were 
publicly posted to be "hostile," while another court finds the posting 
and proffering new data demonstrating a 34.5% reversal rate in claim 
construction cases adjudicated by the Federal Circuit). While such a high 
reversal rate indicates some unpredictability in that area of law-an 
unpredictability apparently stemming from ambiguous doctrine and capricious 
reasoning by certain judges, it does not speak to disuniformity among separate 
courts. Put another way, the data suggest disuniformity within a single court 
over a period of time rather than between multiple courts at any one point in 
time. This Article addresses the latter conception of uniformity. 
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000). 
30. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l). 
31. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998). 
32. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982). 
2007] REASSESSING FEDERAL JURISDICTION 259 
of such pictures does not create a hostile work environment, 
"hostile" could be said to have two different meanings. But this 
example is unrealistic. Few cases turn on a single fact and even 
when they do, such facts are rarely so generic as to be transferable 
to other cases (thereby serving as precedent). In a hostile work 
environment case, for example, a court will likely base its decision 
on much more than the posting of a sexually suggestive picture, and 
even if it did not, other factors (such as the employee's frequency of 
exposure) would likely be relevant. 
On the other hand, judicial resolution of mixed questions of law 
are often preceded by statements of the applicable law. Thus, before 
deciding whether a particular workplace is "hostile," courts often 
explain in somewhat general terms what "hostile" means. If 
different courts explained the meaning differently, "hostile" could 
again be said to have multiple meanings. In theory, such 
explanations of the law are mere dicta compared to the holding-
which is the court's actual decision and has precedential effect. In 
practice, however, judicial explanations of the law-whether 
classified as holding or dicta-are relied upon by subsequent courts 
and have effect on the meaning of the law. 
Where does this leave us in the study of uniformity? Ideally, a 
study of state court adjudication of federal law would ascertain the 
extent to which state courts "made" law-either through deciding 
pure questions of law or explaining law prior to deciding mixed 
questions. This is easier said than done, however. Classifying even 
one question as either a pure question of law or a mixed question is 
a notoriously difficult endeavor.33 And to classify the many 
hundreds necessary for a complete empirical study might be next to 
impossible. Similarly, tracing the impact of hundreds of separate 
state court decisions over time would be highly burdensome, if not 
impossible. Thus, in presenting evidence on the resolution of federal 
questions in state and federal courts, this Article does not 
distinguish between pure and mixed questions of law. This is 
unlikely to affect the results presented herein, however, because the 
evidence marshaled on the uniformity issue does not hinge on the 
type of question presented. Rather, the Article studies the nature 
33. One court struggling with such issues has referred to mixed questions 
as "elusive abominations." S&E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 433 F.2d 
1373, 1378 (Ct. Cl. 1970), rev'd, 406 U.S. 1 (1972). For an explanation of the 
complexity in this area, see Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the 
Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Confiict, 64 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 235, 235-36 (1991). For an argument that there is no such 
distinction at all, see Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-
Fact Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1769, 1800-06 (2003). 
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and methods of adjudication-all of which will apply with equal 
force regardless of whether the federal question is pure or mixed. 
With that, this section now turns to evidence that calls into doubt 
the uniformity rationale. 
A. The Nature of Legal Questions 
As suggested at the outset of this section, questions of law differ 
dramatically from other categories of questions. The difference lies 
in the range of available answers imposed by the question. The hero 
question posed above-which might be called "open-ended"-
imposes virtually no constraints on the range of answers. If the 
respondent were instead asked to name his currently living personal 
hero, the range of answers would be slightly more constrained and 
the question would thus be somewhat more "close-ended." On the 
continuum between open- and close-ended questions, legal questions 
lie quite close to the close-ended pole. 
For example, consider the following typical federal question: 
When a school designs an individualized education plan for a 
student pursuant to the Americans with Disability Education Act 
("ADEA''), and the student contends that the plan is insufficient, 
which party-the student or school-bears the burden of proving (or 
disproving) the plan's compliance with the ADEA? In deciding this 
question, it is important to note that a judge will not be constrained 
by the text of the statute, for the statute is silent on the issue.34 
Assume also, for the purposes of this example, that no other piece of 
positive law suggests an answer to the question. Even here, where 
the judge is free to simply meditate on the metaphysical nature of 
"burden" or the importance of education in a democratic society, she 
would still be forced to answer the question in one of two ways: 
either the student or school bears the burden.35 And for that matter, 
even if a thousand separate judges from all walks of life were 
34. 20 u.s.c. §§ 1400-1482 (2000). 
35. This point is an important one, for it discounts the objections that 
would likely be advanced by adherents to the Legal Realist and Critical Legal 
Studies ("CLS") movements. Under those schools of thought, text, precedent, 
and other forms of positive law impose only weak constraints on judges. See 
generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 100 (1930); DUNCAN 
KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE (1997). This is 
undoubtedly true in a substantial number of cases. Yet, because the binary 
nature of legal questions constrains the judge in a way that she cannot avoid, 
the variability of legal answers will not be significantly increased even by 
judges determined to rule without regard for law. Put another way, while the 
Realists and CLS proponents might be correct that judges can manipulate 
positive law to reach their own conclusions, it is not always true that judges can 
manipulate the menu of decisions they can reach. 
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permitted to meditate on the question, the variability in responses 
would be limited to the same number potentially generated by two 
judges. 
Naturally, the force of this argument depends on the extent to 
which federal questions admit of only a few answers. While the 
ADEA question described above admits of only two possible 
answers, other legal questions might admit of several different 
answers. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
for example, lends itself to a plethora of interpretations. It becomes 
necessary, therefore, to assess the incidence of binary or multiple 
interpretations of federal law. One useful way to assess this is to 
analyze the cases collected in U.S. Law Week's periodic "Circuit Split 
Roundup."36 In its "Roundup," U.S. Law Week lists "cases that 
acknowledge and describe disagreements in the federal courts of 
appeals on various questions."37 A review of the splits noted during 
1998, 1999, 2002, and 2003-some 1017 cases-reveals that the 








Table 1: Circuit Splits 
Reported in U.S. Law Week 















As illustrated in Table 1, when federal courts split on the 
meaning of federal law, they almost always split into two camps. 
Only nine percent of the time do federal courts split into three or 
36. The use of U.S. Law Week's "Circuit Split Round-Up" in this fashion is 
not new. Another commentator, Arthur Hellman (who has studied federal 
circuit splits in detail for the U.S. Government) has relied on the resource in an 
extended study of the subject. See Arthur D. Hellman, Never the Same River 
Twice: The Empirics and Epistemology of Intercircuit Conflicts, 63 U. PrIT. L. 
REV. 81, 141-43 (2001). 
37. 67 U.S. LAW WEEK 2334 (Dec. 8, 1998). 
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more camps.38 These statistics suggest that there is likely an "upper 
limit" on the variety of interpretations of federal law. This, of 
course, does not conclusively prove that state courts will also divide 
into two camps most of the time. It does, however, suggest that, in 
the adjudication of federal law, a certain phenomenon is at work 
that impedes high variability in the results. To be sure, it is 
possible that the phenomenon has as much to do with the 
decisionmaker as the type of decision presented. I address that 
possibility in the following section. 
Before moving on, it is useful to note here that the data in Table 
1 shows a considerable level of disuniformity in the federal system 
on its own. Over 1000 disagreements of federal law-which, of 
course, include only the splits uncovered by U.S. Law Week-is quite 
significant. 39 Moreover, one must remember that these 1000 
decisions include only splits between circuits. Federal district 
courts publish many times more opinions and no doubt disagree 
with themselves-both within and without the same circuit-on 
many issues that have not yet yielded published appellate opinions. 
These observations are important because the key issue in assessing 
uniformity in a world of state court adjudication is not whether 
disuniformity will occur, but whether it will occur more often when 
state courts decide federal questions. Given the rate of 
disagreement already extant in the federal circuits, this sets a high 
bar for those supporting uniformity rationale to clear. 
B. Norms of State Court Judging 
Thus far, I have suggested that state court adjudication of 
federal questions is unlikely to dramatically increase variability in 
federal law because the nature of legal questions will, to a certain 
extent, constrain the range of available answers. This point, 
38. Of course, Table 1 only addresses instances where there is a split on the 
meaning of federal law. In cases where federal courts are in complete 
agreement on the meaning of federal law even though the law is susceptible to 
multiple (and reasonable) interpretations, state courts might still contribute to 
disuniformity inasmuch as they opt for one of the reasonable interpretations not 
chosen by the federal courts. As explained infra Part III.B, there are reasons to 
doubt that this would occur. 
39. I recognize that this claim is inherently subjective. That is, without the 
opportunity to compare disuniformity as evidenced in Table 1, supra, with 
disuniformity that might develop under an alternate system, it is difficult to say 
with any certainty whether 1000 circuit splits over four years is indeed 
"significant." Nonetheless, I bring up the matter here to remind the reader that 
disuniformity is undeniably part of the federal system and that a proper 
analysis of this issue should not focus on whether state adjudication of federal 
law creates any disuniformity, but whether it creates more disuniformity. 
2007] REASSESSING FEDERAL JURISDICTION 263 
however, does not foreclose the chance that state court adjudication 
of federal questions might increase variability in federal law. For 
example, it is possible that federal courts, as a behavioral matter, 
tend to align themselves into two camps even though the federal 
question is amenable to more than two interpretations. In this case, 
it is quite plausible that state courts, not being part of the federal 
circuit environment, might opt for a third, fourth, or even fifth 
interpretation. Additionally, it is quite possible that, on issues 
where federal courts are in complete agreement, state courts might 
depart from the federal view and create variability where there was 
none before.40 A study of the norms of state court judging, however, 
provides reasons to doubt this inference. As explained below, (1) 
state courts routinely rely on federal precedent in making their 
decisions, suggesting that their decisions will often comport with 
those of the federal courts, and (2) even when state courts judge in 
the comparatively unconstrained field of state common law, the 
variability in their results remains quite limited. 
State reliance on federal precedent. In deciding federal 
questions, state courts appear to rely on federal precedent quite 
often.41 Evidence of this is presented in Table 2, infra, which 
40. See, e.g., Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1244 (N.J. 
1990) (rejecting the uniform view of the federal circuits on a preemption issue 
and siding instead with a state supreme court decision from another state). In 
an insightful paper, Professor Donald Zeigler has catalogued the "extraordinary 
number of different positions" state courts take on following federal precedent-
including positions such as "slavishly follow" and "totally disregard." Donald H. 
Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Refiections on the Standards State Judges 
Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1153 
(1999). While Professor Zeigler's paper is a useful compendium of approaches 
state courts take, it is not (nor does it purport to be) an empirical analysis of 
how state courts handle federal precedent on the whole. No doubt, some state 
courts (like some federal courts) often resist binding or persuasive precedent. 
This study suggests, however, that such behavior is not typical in the courts. 
41. One must recognize at the outset that judges do not always speak 
truthfully in their opinions. As Larry Solan explained in an insightful book on 
language and judicial opinion-writing, judges face a "temptation to report the 
reasons behind their decisions less than fully and openly" because they must 
both justify their authority and appear neutral. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE 
LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 2-3 (1993); see also Lauren Robel, The Practice of 
Precedent: Anastasofi; Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an 
Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399, 400 (2002) ("Our cultural 
conception of precedent ... includes shared understandings of the judicial role, 
which includes the burdens of justification."). Admitting incertitude or 
extralegal motivations, though honest, would significantly interfere with the 
satisfaction of these goals. If Solan is correct that judges write opinions so as to 
justify their authority (which is almost certainly true in at least some respects), 
the citation of federal precedent may be an effort to justify authority rather 
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summarizes the results of a study of 190 randomly selected state 
court opinions addressing federal questions.42 
Table 2: State Court Reliance on Federal 
Precedent In Resolving Federal Questions 
Number Percentage 
Total cases sampled 190 100 
Total or almost total reliance 66 34.7 
on federal precedent 
Reliance on federal and state 45 23.7 precedent 
Total or almost total reliance on state 58 30.5 precedent 
No reliance on precedent 21 11.1 
As this data shows, federal precedent plays a significant role in 
state court resolution of federal questions. In fifty-eight percent of 
the cases, state courts relied wholly or partially on federal 
precedent. While fifty-eight percent is certainly significant, it also 
means that state courts did not rely on federal precedent in nearly 
forty-two percent of the opinions. While this might give rise to 
concern, a closer analysis of the data partially allays this concern. 
According to the analysis of the circuit splits reported in U.S. 
Law Week, splits occur most often over questions of federal statutes 
or regulations rather than over constitutional questions. Of the 1017 
circuit splits reported in 1998, 1999, 2002, and 2003, 87.4% 
pertained to federal statutes and only 12.6% involved constitutional 
questions.43 Thus, to better assess state reliance on federal 
precedent, one should focus on the cases that are typically ripe for 
disuniformity. 
than truthfully explain one's decision. While this may be the case in some state 
cases citing federal precedent, it would be erroneous to assume that all citations 
offederal precedent are mere shams. Thus, while it would be imprudent to rest 
the entire uniformity analysis on this point alone, it is fair to include this 
among the other factors in this section. 
42. These opinions were sampled from 384 opinions published by state 
appellate courts of mandatory jurisdiction published during 1991 and 2001, 
which themselves were selected from over 4000 state civil opinions publishing 
during those same years. For a full description of how these cases were 
collected, see infra, notes 67-74 and accompanying text. 
43. Specifically, of the 1017 splits, 128 involved the federal constitution and 
889 involved federal statutes. 
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Table 3: State Court Reliance on Federal Precedent 
in Resolving Statutory Federal Questions 
265 
Number Percentage 
Total statutory federal questions in 61 100 
sample 
Total or almost total reliance 33 54.1 
on federal precedent 
Reliance on federal and state 13 21.3 precedent 
Total or almost total reliance 8 13.1 
on state precedent 
No reliance on precedent 7 11.5 
As Table 3 illustrates, state courts rely more heavily on federal 
precedent in resolving statutory federal questions than 
constitutional federal questions. In these cases, state courts rely on 
federal precedent over seventy-five percent of the time. Thus, in the 
most common field where federal courts split, state courts rely on 
federal precedent rather often. This, of course, does not guarantee 
uniformity in these cases, but it does suggest that state courts do 
not take a "freelance" approach in deciding federal questions.44 
Instead, they appear to search for and adhere to federal precedent a 
significant portion of the time. 
To be sure, state reliance on federal precedent may be seen as 
undercutting the uniformity argument in this Article. That is, if 
this Article argues that federal question jurisdiction does not 
necessarily preserve uniformity in the interpretation of federal law, 
then data showing that state courts use federal precedent to resolve 
federal questions suggests that federal question jurisdiction indeed 
helps maintain uniformity in federal law. This argument has merit, 
but does not necessarily defeat the import of the point advanced 
herein. My argument-that state court adjudication of federal law 
will not certainly affect the uniformity of federal law-is aimed 
primarily at the common doctrinal questions facing courts. For 
44. It is beyond the scope of this Article to inquire into why state courts 
rely on federal precedent less on civil constitutional questions, but one might 
guess that they are much more familiar with the analysis of such questions-
both because federal constitutional issues arise more often than statutory 
issues in state courts, see Table 11, infra, and because state constitutions often 
have provisions mirroring federal constitutional provisions. For an insightful 
study of state constitutional interpretation, see generally JAMES A. GARDNER, 
INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A 
FEDERAL SYSTEM (2005). 
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example, the uniformity argument advanced herein will be relevant 
to federal courts in determining whether a particular federal 
question is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, or 
may be heard in either state or federal courts.45 To be sure, my 
uniformity argument is at its weakest (on the point of state reliance 
on federal precedent, at least) when federal courts are called on to 
determine whether state courts, rather than federal, have exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear a federal claim. In such cases, state reliance on 
federal precedent would be problematic because, state jurisdiction 
being exclusive, there would be no federal precedent to rely on. 
While I readily admit that my data on state adherence to federal 
precedent would point toward disuniformity in this class of cases, I 
also note that these cases are quite rare.46 
State common law decisions. Because "[t]here is no federal ... 
common law," federal questions arising in state courts stem from 
federal statutes or the federal constitution.47 Functionally speaking, 
the text of statutes or the constitution (as well as precedents 
interpreting these texts) impose stricter constraints on an 
interpreting court (whether state or federal) than pure common law 
imposes on a state supreme court. Thus, in assessing the degree to 
which state courts might split on interpretations of federal law, it is 
instructive to look to how they split on common law questions. If, 
given the wide discretion afforded to common law courts, state 
courts still split in a relatively few number of ways, this would 
suggest that state court interpretations of federal law would vary to 
the same degree (or even to a lesser degree) than federal court 
interpretations. 
To assess the variability of common law between the states, I 
reviewed several hornbooks on three areas of law typically 
45. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 483-84 (1981) 
(explaining that the "desirability of uniform interpretation" is a factor to be 
considered in determining whether federal jurisdiction should be exclusive or 
concurrent). 
46. Examples of federal laws creating exclusive state court jurisdiction 
include the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000), the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(l) (2000), and 12 U.S.C. § 1819(D) 
(2000) (addressing suits against the FDIC as a receiver that involve only the 
rights or obligations of depositors, creditors, and stockholders under state law). 
47. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). This, of course, is a bit 
of an overstatement because, in limited circumstances, federal courts have 
created federal common law to protect federal interests. See, e.g., Clearfield 
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943). While state courts are 
occasionally called upon to apply (or even create) federal common law, see 
Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 825 (2005), such instances are quite rare relative to the 
instances of statutory and constitutional interpretation. 
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dominated by state common law: torts, contracts, and property.48 To 
make the analysis as methodical as possible, I paged through each 
book from start to finish and scanned for places where the authors 
noted splits of authority.49 While I do not contend that this research 
provides a complete picture of the variability of law in these areas, I 
do think it provides a representative sample of the splits. The 
results are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: Variability of Common Law Between 
States in Torts, Contracts, and Property50 
Number Percentage of total 
Torts - Total splits 51 100.0 
Two-way splits 34 66.7 
Three-way splits 8 15.7 
Four-way splits 6 11.8 
Five-way splits 3 5.9 
Contracts - Total splits 90 100.0 
Two-way splits 69 76.7 
Three-way splits 16 17.8 
Four-way splits 4 4.4 
Five-way splits 1 1.1 
Property - Total splits 67 100.0 
Two-way splits 60 89.6 
Three-way splits 6 9.0 
Four-way splits 1 1.5 
Five-way splits 0 0.0 
Total Splits 208 100.0 
Two-way splits 163 78.4 
Three-way splits 30 14.4 
Four-way splits 11 5.3 
Five-way splits 4 1.9 
48. The hornbooks used were RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY: 
AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY (4th ed. 1991); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 
(2000); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS (5th ed. 2003). 
49. While certain areas of state common law may be more prominent than 
others in terms of the number of adjudications, my goal was simply to discern 
the frequency of splits between states in as methodical a fashion as possible. 
Hornbooks, because they typically cover a broad spectrum of topics and aim to 
summarize the law (including majority and minority views), seemed the best 
choice to accomplish this task. Targeted research on specific splits between 
states would always risk the chance that the splits discovered were not 
representative of the whole. 
50. Descriptions of the specific splits and citations to the relevant pages of 
the hornbooks are on file with the author. 
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As Table 4 illustrates, when state courts disagree on the content 
of traditional common law subjects, only two or three different 
positions typically emerge. Given the plenary discretion state 
judges enjoy in common law decisionmaking, this suggests that 
some type of behavioral norm is likely at work. 51 This norm is likely 
to govern the state courts' decisionmaking in federal questions as 
well. 
C. Precedential Power 
In addition to the close-ended nature of legal questions and 
state court judging norms, state court civil adjudications are 
unlikely to increase the disuniformity of federal law because they 
have relatively weak precedential effect. Significant disuniformity 
will only flow from decisions having significant precedential power. 
To be sure, inasmuch as a single decision differs from the settled 
view, that decision in itself creates some-albeit quite small-
amount of disuniformity. But in the federal and state systems, 
where hundreds of thousands of federal questions are decided in 
civil cases each year, a single errant decision by a state trial court 
does little to affect the overall uniformity of federal law. On the 
other hand, a single decision by a federal circuit court on the same 
issue may have a significant impact on the decisions of other courts 
and consequently the uniformity of law in that field. Thus, to assess 
whether state court adjudications will injure the uniformity of 
federal law, one must assess the impact of state decisions. In the 
field of adjudication, a decision's impact on other courts can be 
measured by citations.52 If a court issues an opinion that is never 
subsequently cited, it is reasonable to conclude the opinion had little 
effect on the law. To be sure, judges and clerks might read the 
51. It is beyond the scope of this Article to prove why state common law 
rules tend to split into only two or three camps. One could easily hypothesize, 
however, that the social sciences-particularly the field of behavioral 
economics-has much to say about the subject. 
52. Studying citations to gauge the impact of judicial opinion is not new. 
See, e.g., James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the 
Legal Importance of Supreme Court Precedents (2006), available at http:// 
ssm.com/abstract=906827 (tracking citations to develop a "network" account of 
an opinion's precedential import); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 367, 374 (1980) (analyzing citation frequency to assess the force of 
precedent because "the number of citations to a case and the rate at which the 
case depreciates in citations in later opinions appear to provide reasonable 
proxies for the precedential value of an appellate decision"); Michael E. 
Solimine, Rethinking Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 383, 
415-16 (1991). 
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op1mon and apply its reasoning without citing it, but this is 
uncommon, especially given the judicial desire to justify the exercise 
of undemocratic authority.53 
Before presenting the citation data, however, it is important to 
note two prerequisites for even a single citation: an appeal and a 
published opinion. First, although trial courts obviously address 
federal questions in the first instance, they rarely, if ever, publish 
their opinions. Thus, trial court adjudications of federal law will, as 
a practical matter, never have precedential effect. To develop into 
precedent, the case must be appealed. While it is difficult to 
ascertain the civil appeal rate in the state courts, it is likely no more 
than 10.9%, which is the rate in the federal system.54 Thus, 
approximately nine out of ten times, a civil decision on federal law 
will not even make it to a court that publishes opinions. If a case 
reaches that level, however, it is still unlikely that it will develop 
into precedent because state appellate courts likely publish only a 
fraction of their opinions. If the publication rate is ten percent, 
which is a reasonable estimate,55 only 1 in 100 federal questions 
53. See SOLAN, supra note 41, at 2-3 (explaining the judiciary's desire to 
justify its authority when drafting judicial opinions). 
54. Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried 
Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 659, 663-64 tbl.1 (2004) (finding the federal civil appeal rate to be 
10.9% in cases filed between 1986 and 1997). While it is plausible that federal 
questions involving constitutional rights and certain statutory rights against 
discrimination might be appealed at a higher rate because of the litigant's 
investment in the matter, I have uncovered no empirical evidence that this is 
the case. 
55. While there is little data on state publication rates, I compute a rate of 
6.1 % elsewhere in this Article. See infra note 76 and accompanying text. While 
I have no reason to doubt this value, federal court publication rates are 
commonly thought to be near twenty percent. See David Greenwald & 
Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1133, 1135 (2002) ("[A]ppellate judges specifically designate for exclusion from 
the bound volumes of the Federal Reporter approximately 80% of the opinions 
they write."); Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 Omo 
ST. L.J. 177, 189 (1999) (finding that nationally, 78.9% of appellate decisions 
went unpublished in 1995 and 1996, and that in the Fourth Circuit that rate 
was as high as 90.3%). In light of the federal rate, and for ease of explanation 
in this case, a ten percent publication rate is a reasonable estimate. 
It is possible, of course, that unpublished opinions could affect the decision 
of state courts. "Unpublished" decisions are routinely made available on a 
variety of legal databases and an appellate judge might conceivably rely on such 
opinions in deciding a case. While this is possible, the judge would still be 
constrained by the no-citation rules still common in many state courts. See 
Stephen R. Barnett, No-Citation Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield Report and 
Analysis, 5 J. APP. PRAG. & PROCESS 473, 499 (2003) (collecting no-citation rules 
from all fifty states and noting that twenty-five states expressly forbid citation 
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decided by state trial courts will ever ripen into precedent that could 
potentially be cited. 
If a case is fortunate enough to be that 1 in 100, however, the 
data below suggests that there is only a small likelihood that it will 
serve as meaningful precedent. Presented in Tables 5 and 6, are the 
results of a study of 190 randomly selected state court opinions 
resolving federal questions.56 Table 5 contains the citation history 
for 110 opinions issued in 1991 and Table 6 contains the citation 
history for 80 opinions issued in 2001.57 
Table 5: State Court Citations to State Federal-
Question Opinions Issued in 1991 
Citations Opinions with Percentage of 
(x) (x) citations total opinions 
0 citations 50 45.5 
1 citation 22 20.0 
2 citations 9 8.2 
3 citations 11 10.0 
4 citations 4 3.6 
5 citations 2 1.8 
6 citations 3 2.7 
7 citations 2 1.8 
8 citations 1 0.9 
9 citations 5 4.5 
10 citations 1 0.9 
Average #of citations per opinion 1.67 
Standard of deviation 2.44 
of unpublished opm10ns and twelve permit citation of such opm10ns as 
persuasive precedent). Being unable to cite the "unpublished" opinion will 
constrain the judge to some degree in explicating the applicable law. To be 
sure, judges can almost always find a way to say what they wish, unpublished 
opinion or not, but it is fair to say that published opinions exert a stronger force 
on judges' decisionmaking than unpublished opinions. 
56. Citations were counted using the Westlaw database. Each of the 190 
opinions was "KeyCited" to determine the number of opinions citing to the 
sample opinion for its resolution of a federal question. The state court opinions 
resolving federal questions that were "KeyCited" for this analysis were pulled 
from a survey of state court opinions performed for this Article. The survey, 
which relates most to the "experience" argument, is explained later in the 
Article. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text. 
57. These citations were counted in August 2006. I divided the citation 
count into two tables because, theoretically at least, the number of citations for 
1991 opinion should be higher than the number of a 2001 opinion at any single 
point in time. As some scholars have noted, however, precedent "depreciates" in 
value and, after a certain period of time, is no longer cited with regularity. 
Landes & Posner, supra note 52, at 376-80. 
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Table 6: State Court Citations to State Federal-Question 
Opinions Issued in 2001 
Citations Opinions with Percentage of 
(x) (x) citations total opinions 
0 citations 41 51.2 
1 citation 16 20.0 
2 citations 10 12.5 
3 citations 6 7.5 
4 citations 4 5.0 
5 citations 1 1.3 
6 citations 1 1.3 
7 citations 0 0.0 
8 citations 1 1.6 
9 citations 0 0.0 
10 citations 0 0.0 
Average # of citations per opinion 1.11 
Standard of deviation 1.59 
Tables 5 and 6 illustrate that the federal questions resolved by 
state courts do not likely have significant impact on the content of 
federal law. Nearly half the opinions, for example, have yet to be 
cited even once for the federal question they resolved. While some 
opinions clearly have guided other courts, the percentage of opinions 
with over five citations is quite small-just thirteen percent for the 
1991 opinions and three percent for the 2001 opinions.58 Moreover, 
the average number of citations for both sets of opinions is well 
below two, which is roughly indicative of the whole, given the low 
standards of deviation. Thus, while certainly not conclusive, these 
data nonetheless suggests that state court opinions resolving federal 
law do not have strong precedential force and are therefore unlikely 
to significantly injure uniformity. 
A useful way to consider the combined impact of the above 
points on uniformity is to consider the chain of events that must 
occur for state court adjudications to decrease the level of uniformity 
currently extant at the federal level. First, the federal question 
must be amenable to a variety of different interpretations or the 
federal courts must be in uniform agreement as to the meaning of 
that federal question. If either of these conditions are satisfied 
58. Moreover, some citations are not especially indicative of precedential 
value. In some cases, opinions are cited not to support an argument, but just to 
note that another court has addressed the issue. In other cases, opinions might 
be cited for their arguments, but with a "but see" signal, indicating that the 
opinion is not persuasive. 
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(which, as shown supra, is not extremely common), the state court 
must then pay little heed to federal precedent and depart from its 
usual habit of choosing among views currently established in other 
courts. If, in the minority of cases where this might occur, a state 
court actually decides a question of federal law incorrectly, it must 
then publish that opinion and have it relied upon as precedent for 
disuniformity to flourish. Moreover, because trial courts very rarely 
publish opinions, the matter will likely have no precedential effect 
until it proceeds to the appellate level, which only occurs in a small 
fraction of cases. For disuniformity to emanate from that court, of 
course, it too must ignore federal precedent, depart from other 
settled views, publish its opinion, and have it relied upon as 
precedent. Of course, this is unlikely. 
Having addressed the uniformity rationale, this Article now 
turns to the experience rationale. 
IV. EXPERIENCE 
The belief that federal courts have greater experience in federal 
law is based on the supposition that federal courts hear many more 
federal questions than state courts. While federal courts obviously 
hear large numbers of federal claims, one might think that state 
courts also have experience based on the federal claims they hear. 
Under various interpretations of § 1331 or other judge-made 
doctrines, federal questions appear in state civil proceedings on a 
somewhat routine basis. For instance, because state courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over most federal 
issues, parties may choose to litigate their federal disputes in state 
courts.59 Or, where the only federal question in a case arises as a 
defense, the parties are obliged to rely on state courts to resolve 
their claims.60 Similarly, if a federal question on the face of a 
complaint is not "substantial," a federal court may not assert 
jurisdiction under§ 1331 and the parties must litigate the matter in 
state court.61 In still other cases, even where a substantial federal 
59. Taffiin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) ("[W]e have consistently held 
that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively 
competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States."); 
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (holding that state courts must 
adjudicate federal questions if they have "jurisdiction adequate and appropriate 
under established local law to adjudicate" the federal question). 
60. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); see 
also Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) ("A 
defense that raises a federal question is inadequate to confer federal 
jurisdiction.") (citing Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152). 
61. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 545 U.S. 
308, 314 (2005) (holding that federal question jurisdiction does not obtain 
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question is pleaded on the face of the complaint, a federal court may 
still choose to abstain from hearing the matter, thereby relegating 
the parties to state court.62 Based on these doctrines, many scholars 
have long presumed that state courts decide significant numbers of 
federal questions in civil cases.63 
Despite this presumption, there is a complete dearth of data on 
what federal questions state courts actually decide. To my 
knowledge, no individual or organization has ever made an effort to 
catalog the number and nature of civil federal questions that state 
courts routinely decide.64 To begin to fill this gap in the scholarship, 
I reviewed the published civil opinions issued by the appellate 
courts of fifteen states during 1991 and 2001.65 Although more 
research must be done, it is clear from the research thus far that 
state courts, in general, decide a comparatively modest number of 
civil cases involving federal questions, and therefore have less 
experience than federal courts.66 However, this does not tell the 
unless a federal question is "substantial" such that a "federal forum may 
entertain [the question] without disturbing any congressionally approved 
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities"). 
62. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 
423, 432 (1982) (extending Younger; holding that a federal court may not 
adjudicate federal issues involved in a currently pending civil enforcement 
proceeding); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1971) (holding that a federal 
court must abstain from adjudicating claims involved in a currently pending 
criminal proceeding); Burford v Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (holding that a 
federal court should permanently abstain from hearing federal claims involving 
unclear law and complex state regulatory frameworks). 
63. See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673 
(1950) (noting that abrogating the well-pleaded complaint rule would cause the 
federal courts to be overrun with a "vast current of litigation"); Mishkin, supra 
note 11, at 162 (stating that, granting federal courts ''virtually the full 
constitutional range of jurisdiction over federal questions might well flood the 
national courts, thereby deflecting them from their real functions"). 
64. To my knowledge, only three studies have addressed this issue, though 
all of them were narrow in scope. Two studies focused only on federal questions 
adjudicated in state supreme courts. A third study, while more comprehensive 
in terms of courts, only focused on § 1983 actions. See Daniel J. Meador, 
Federal Law in State Supreme Courts, 3 CONST. COMM. 347 (1986) (studying 
federal questions decided in the supreme courts of seven states); National 
Center for State Courts, Comparison of Federal Legal Infiuences on State 
Supreme Court Decisions in 1959 and 1979 (1981) (researching federal law 
adjudicated in four state supreme courts by counting citations to federal cases); 
Solimine, supra note 52, at 413-19 (researching § 1983 claims decided in state 
courts). 
65. The states were Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Washington, 
and Wyoming. 
66. I recognize, of course, that state courts decide many questions (both 
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entire story. Upon more careful inspection, state courts likely have 
significant experience in certain, limited areas of federal law. 
Before presenting the results of this study, it is necessary to 
explain the study's methodology. First, the universe of state cases 
studied were the civil opinions published in West's Pacific Reporter67 
during 1991 and 2001 by courts of mandatory jurisdiction.68 Second, 
note the focus on civil cases. Because this Article explores the 
purposes of federal question jurisdiction (which is obtained only in 
civil cases), it makes sense to study the civil cases adjudicated in 
state and federal courts. While state criminal prosecutions often 
involve federal questions (typically based on the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Amendments), these cases are not cognizable in federal courts. 
Furthermore, there is virtually uniform agreement that such cases 
should not be litigated in federal court.69 Thus, in a federal question 
jurisdiction analysis, the most appropriate universe of cases are civil 
state and federal) that are not memorialized in a published opinion. This fact is 
unlikely to affect the conclusions reached in this Article because the conclusions 
rely on percentages rather than aggregate numbers of cases. As long as the 
publication rate is roughly similar among federal question and non-federal 
question cases (and there is no reason to believe it would significantly differ), 
the percentages are likely to be trustworthy. 
67. I chose to focus on West's Pacific Reporter because it covers the same 
states as those within the Ninth and Tenth Circuits of the federal system. This 
allows one to make greater use of federal court statistics, which are often 
grouped by circuit. 
68. In most states, courts of mandatory jurisdiction-i.e., courts that must 
hear cases properly within their subject matter jurisdiction-are trial and 
intermediate appellate courts. Some states, however, do not have intermediate 
appellate courts and rely on their supreme courts to handle appeals. These 
courts, although typically called "supreme courts," are nonetheless courts of 
mandatory jurisdiction. The states in this study without intermediate appellate 
courts are Montana, Nevada, and Wyoming. 
69. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 3, at 1241 (arguing that sovereign law 
should be litigated in sovereign courts). Of course, scholars have debated the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Younger u. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), that state 
criminal defendants may not challenge ongoing state court prosecutions in 
federal courts. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme 
Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990) (arguing 
that abstention doctrine is the product of a "dialogic process of congressional 
enactment and judicial response"); Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of 
Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984) (arguing 
that judicial abstention violates separation of powers); Michael Wells, Why 
Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097 (1985) 
(disagreeing with Professor Redish). Yet a suit of this type would amount to a 
collateral federal action that could not alternately be filed in state court. It 
therefore differs greatly from the typical civil case involving a federal question 
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To determine which civil cases in the Pacific Reporter 
potentially contained federal questions, I used the Westlaw 
database to identify cases that contained the term "U.S.C.A."71 
Anytime a state court refers to a federal statute or the federal 
constitution-regardless of how the court cites the provision or even 
if the court fails to cite the provision72-West inserts a citation 
containing "U.S.C.A." into the "Headnote" dealing with that portion 
of the opinion. After obtaining a list of cases containing the term 
"U.S.C.A.," I then read the cases to determine which ones actually 
involved the resolution of a federal question. This was necessary 
because, in many instances, state courts cited federal law not as 
part of any analysis of a federal question, but simply as background 
or as part of a tangential statement. 73 While reading the cases, I 
noted the federal law that the court interpreted as well as the 
Headnote under which the decision appeared. Therefore, this 
process yielded a list of all federal questions decided by state courts 
of mandatory jurisdiction in civil cases during 1991and2001.74 The 
70. While state habeas proceedings as well as certain parole hearings are 
often couched as civil actions, I excluded such cases from the state cases 
surveyed because, although they are civil in nature and may involve federal 
questions, they could not be filed in federal court under federal question 
jurisdiction. This is so not because federal question jurisdiction excludes such 
cases, but because the Court has concluded they are cognizable only under the 
federal courts' habeas jurisdiction. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 4 77 (1994). 
71. Additionally, during most of the 1990s, West published an index at the 
beginning of each volume listing the cases reported within that volume that 
cited federal law of any type. At some point, West stopped publishing this index 
and the only way to discern which state cases potentially involve federal law is 
to search the Westlaw database for the term "U.S.C.A." 
72. For instance, if a state court deals summarily with an equal protection 
claim under the federal Constitution and does not cite to the federal 
Constitution, West would still insert "U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14" into the 
Headnote dealing with that portion of the case. 
73. For example, many states sanction attorneys for committing criminal 
acts. In issuing a disciplinary opinion dealing with an attorney who has 
violated a federal wire fraud statute, for example, the state court will often cite 
the federal wire fraud statute as predicate to sanctioning the attorney. 
Although the state court cited federal law, it did not resolve any federal 
question. See, e.g., People v. DeRose, 35 P.3d 708 (Colo. 2001). 
7 4. In any study of this sort, an important concern is whether the sample of 
cases studied is representative of the entire universe of cases. In the context of 
this study, one might wonder whether the cases issued by the state and federal 
courts of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits are representative of those issued across 
the entire country. Given that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits encompass fifteen 
states with a broad variety of different populations, economies, cultures, and 
other characteristics (compare California to Kansas to Idaho to Utah to 
Washington) there is little reason to conclude that the cases issued in this 
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Article now turns to this data, beginning first with a general picture 
of state court experience followed by a more particular description of 
such experience. 
A. In General 
Looking at the overall results of the study, one notices 
immediately that state courts do not decide huge numbers of civil 
federal questions. Among the civil opinions published by the 
appellate courts of mandatory jurisdiction in the fifteen states of the 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits, federal questions arose in roughly ten 
percent of the civil opinions published in 1991and2001.75 
region of the country are unrepresentative of the whole. 
75. I calculated the total number of published civil opinions from courts of 
mandatory jurisdiction in two steps. First, I searched the Westlaw "allstates" 
database for all published civil opinions during 1991 for the fifteen states 
covered in the Pacific reporter. To do this, I constructed a search that would 
retrieve every published opinion (1) having a "P.2d" in its citation, (2) issued 
during 1991 by a lower court, (3) but that did not have any criminal law "topic 
numbers" listed in any Headnotes, ( 4) did not have any references to a "table" or 
"memorandum" opinion, and (5) did not contain the words "not reported"-
which often indicate an unpublished opinion. (Table or memorandum opinions 
are typically opinions listing cases that have been denied or granted certiorari, 
or listing cases that have otherwise received a summary disposition.) For this 
example, the specific Westlaw search instructions were: 
ci("p.2d") & da(aft 12/31/1990 & bef 1/1/1992) & co(low) % to(llO 197 
203 349 350H) ci(table) ci(mem!) ci("not reported") 
I then repeated this search using the year 2001. 
Second, because the first search only focused on lower court opinions (due 
to the "co(low )" search term), I then searched specific jurisdictions without 
intermediate appellate courts for the same type of cases. To collect such cases 
from the jurisdiction of Montana, for example, I searched the "mt-cs" database 
using the following search terms: 
ci("p.2d") & da(aft 12/31/1990 & bef 1/1/1992) % to(llO 197 203 349 
350H) ci(table) ci(mem!) ci("not reported") 
The only difference between this search and the one noted above is the absence 
of "co(low)." After retrieving cases from the states without intermediate 
appellate courts (which, in the Pacific Reporter, include Montana, Wyoming, 
and Nevada), I added these cases to the total cases retrieved in the first search. 
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Table 7: State Civil Opinions: Federal vs. Non-Federal 
Questions in States of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits 
1991 2001 
Total % Total % 
Total civil opinions published by 
appellate courts of mandatory 2290 100 1712 100 
jurisdiction 
Civil opinions published by 
appellate courts of mandatory 219 9.6 165 9.6 jurisdiction resolving a federal 
question 
While this quantity of federal questions appears rather 
insignificant, it reveals little standing alone. Instead, it must be 
compared to the number of federal questions heard in federal 
appellate courts. Moreover-because the goal here is to assess 
experience, which is a trait of individual judges rather than courts-
one must compare the federal questions resolved per appellate judge. 
This comparison is presented in Table 8. 
Table 8: Federal Questions Decided Per Judge 
in State and Federal Appellate Courts of the 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits (2001) 
State Federal 
Estimated federal questions 
resolved in civil cases by 270576 301077 
appellate courts of mandatory 
jurisdiction 
Number of appellate judges on 24378 6079 
court 
Federal questions resolved 11.l 78.8 per appellate judge 
76. To meaningfully compare state and federal court adjudications of 
federal law, it is necessary to choose a single metric-total published opinions 
or total resolved cases. On the state level, the only feasible way to count the 
number of state court adjudications is to use West's Pacific Reporter-which, by 
definition, contains published opinions. These results are published in Table 7. 
On the federal level, the only feasible way to count federal court adjudications is 
to use the statistics kept by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts-which 
list total resolved cases. (Theoretically, one could page through the Federal 
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Reporters to count cases, but this would be an excessively onerous task and is 
not feasible without a substantial research team.) In light of this divergence, I 
elected to convert the state published opinions to total resolved cases by 
multiplying the number of published opinions by the publication rate of 6.1 %. 
I calculated this rate by dividing the number of opinions published by 
intermediate appellate courts during 2001 in twelve states within West's Pacific 
reporter by the number of cases disposed of by the same courts during 2001. 
According to Westlaw the intermediate appellate courts in Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and 
Washington published 2223 opinions during 2001. (I left the state supreme 
courts of Montana, Wyoming and Nevada out of this calculation because, 
although courts of mandatory jurisdiction, their publication rates are likely to 
be different due to their status as supreme courts.) According to a report by the 
National Center for State Courts, these same courts disposed of 36,618 cases 
during 2001. Brian J. Ostrum et al., Examining the Work of State Courts, 2002: 
A National Perspective from the Court Statistics Project, at 73 (2003), available 
at http://www.ncsconline.org/D _research/CSP/2002_Files/2002_Full_Report. pdf. 
This yields a publication rate of 6.1 %. 
Notably, this number differs somewhat significantly from federal 
publication rates of roughly twenty percent. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra 
note 55, at 1135; Martin, supra note 55, at 189. If the state publication rate 
were actually higher than 6.1 %, the number of federal questions likely resolved 
in state appellate courts would actually be significantly lower. For example, if 
the rate were twenty percent instead of 6.1%, the number of federal questions 
adjudicated in state courts would be only 825 rather than 2705. 
77. This number was calculated by taking the number of terminations on 
the merits in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, 6419, and multiplying it by the 
percentage of cases containing federal questions terminated on the merits in all 
federal courts of appeals. U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/ 
cmsa2001.pl (last visited Mar. 1, 2007). The percentage is 48.9%. U.S. Courts, 
Table B-lA, http:// www. uscourts.gov/judbus2001/appendices/b01asep01.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2007). There is undoubtedly a risk that the percentage of 
federal questions terminated in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits differs from that 
terminated in the other circuits. The variation, however, should not be 
especially large. Even if it were larger than expected, however, it would still 
not overcome the central thrust of this section, which is that federal judges have 
greater experience in federal law than state judges. As Table 9 reveals, the 
experience flows not only from the greater number of federal questions decided 
per court, but also-and quite significantly-from the number of judges sitting 
on each court. In the states of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, state trial judges 
outnumber federal trial judges by nearly 1500%. 
78. Ostrum et al., supra note 76, at 73. 
79. Surprisingly, a reliable way to count the number of federal judges at a 
specific point in time is to consult a volume of West's Federal Reporter 
containing cases from that point in time. This number, which includes both 
active and senior circuit judges, was calculated using volume 240 of the Federal 
Reporter, Third. 240 F.3d xii, xii-xiii (2001). The number includes both active 
and senior circuit court judges, but does not include the periodic participation of 
visiting judges in the cases. 
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Thus, according to Table 8, the average federal appellate judge 
has seven times more experience with federal questions than the 
average state appellate judge. Yet, appellate experience is not an 
especially useful metric for comparing state and federal courts. In 
both the state and federal systems, trial judges have the final say in 
the great majority of cases. Thus, a truer picture of experience-
that is, one experienced by most litigants-must focus on the 
experience of trial judges. 
This is easier said than done, however. Because state trial 
courts rarely, if ever, publish opinions, the only way to estimate the 
number of federal questions adjudicated in trial courts is to use 
appeal rates. Yet, while there is reliable data on federal appeal 
rates,80 there is no such data on state appeal rates. This is perhaps 
due to the wide variety of specialized courts in state systems, many 
of which appeal to differing intermediate appellate or supreme 
courts. 81 This makes it quite difficult to arrive at any single appeal 
rate for the state system. Thus, to compare trial court experience, it 
is necessary to assume a variety of different state court appeal rates. 
In Table 9, federal questions in state trial courts are calculated 
using a conservative, moderate, and liberal appeal rate and the 
federal questions per trial judge are then calculated.82 
80. See Eisenberg, supra note 54, at 663-64 (finding the federal civil appeal 
rate to be 10.9% in cases filed between 1986 and 1997). 
81. For example, many states have a variety of limited subject matter 
courts-such as municipal courts, juvenile courts, family law courts, probate 
courts, water courts, etc.-which may appeal to several different courts, which 
in turn may themselves appeal to different courts. See Ostrum et al., supra 
note 76, at 11 (containing charts of court structures for each state and the 
District of Columbia). Federal questions may arise in any of these courts, but 
are certainly more likely to appear in courts of general jurisdiction. Thus, it is 
difficult if not impossible to calculate a single, representative appeal rate. 
82. I chose these appeal rates based on the evidence of appeal rates in both 
state and federal courts. In state courts, the only available data on appeal rates 
places the rate at 0.7%. James P. George, Access to Justice, Costs, and Legal 
Aid, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 293, 298-99 (2006) (placing the appeal rate at 0. 7% after 
excluding traffic court cases). At the federal level, appeal rates in civil cases 
have repeatedly been placed near ten percent. See Eisenberg, supra note 54, at 
663-64. Using these two rates as end points, I chose five percent as a mid-point 
appeal rate. 
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Table 9: Federal Questions Decided Per Judge 
in State and Federal Trial Courts of the 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits (2001) 
State Federal 
Estimated federal 27,050 (at 10% appeal rate) 
questions resolved in 54,100 (at 5% appeal rate) 43,38583 
trial courts 270,500 (at 1 % appeal rate) 
Number of judges on 286584 19385 trial courts 
Federal questions 9.4 (at 10% appeal rate) 
resolved per trial 18.9 (at 5% appeal rate) 224.8 
judge 94.4 (at 1 % aooeal rate) 
As illustrated in Table 9, even under the most conservative 
appeal rate of one percent, federal trial judges still adjudicate more 
than two times the number of the civil federal questions that state 
judges adjudicate. If the appeal rate is a more plausible five 
percent, however, federal judicial experience exceeds that of states 
judiciaries' by a factor of twelve. And if the state appeal rate turns 
out to be at or near ten percent, federal experience with civil federal 
questions would be nearly twenty-four times state court experience. 
B. In Particular 
The above data suggests that federal judges are indeed likely to 
be more experienced in federal law than state judges. One must be 
careful, however, not to ignore the law of diminishing returns with 
respect to experience. That is, while federal trial judges might hear 
twice the number of civil federal questions as state trial judges 
(assuming the conservative appeal rate of one percent), state trial 
83. This number was calculated using a 10.9% appeal rate. See Eisenberg, 
supra note 54, at 664 tbl. l. 
84. See Ostrum et al., supra note 76, at 11. In counting the judges on the 
state trial courts, I counted only judges in courts of general jurisdiction. Many 
state courts have courts of limited jurisdiction (such as small claims, family or 
probate courts) in which federal questions might conceivably appear. 
Nonetheless, significant numbers of federal questions are unlikely to appear in 
these types of cases and, to compare state court and federal experience in the 
most conservative manner I excluded these from the total. If these judges were 
added to the total state judge count, state inexperience with federal law would 
be even more pronounced. 
85. These judges were counted by referring to the list of judges published in 
2001 in volume 142 of the Federal Supplement, Second. 142 F. Supp. 2d xii, vii-
xxiv (2001). 
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judges might still develop significant experience in federal law from 
those adjudications. After all, adjudicating ninety-four cases each 
year is likely to have an. educational effect on state judges. The 
difficulty with this hypothesis, however, is that there are tens of 
thousands of different federal laws (whether enacted as a 
constitutional provision, statute, regulation, or some other form). 
State trial judges might indeed gain significant experience in a 
federal law if they addressed the same provision ninety-four times 
each year, but they might gain very little experience if they 
adjudicate a particular federal question no more than once every 
couple of years. The only way to properly assess state trial judge 
experience, therefore, is to consider the incidence of particular 
federal questions adjudicated in state courts. As Table 10 makes 
clear, the majority of federal questions resolved in state civil 
opinions are constitutional questions. 
Table 10: State Civil Opinions Resolving Federal Questions 
Published by States of Ninth and Tenth Circuits: 
Statutory v. Constitutional Questions 
1991 2001 
Total % Total % 
Civil opinions resolving federal 219 100 165 100 question(s) 
Civil opinions resolving only 60 27.4 42 25.5 
statutory federal question(s) 
Civil opinions resolving only 
constitutional federal 142 64.8 105 63.6 
question(s) 
Civil opinions resolving 
statutory and constitutional 17 7.8 18 10.9 
federal questions 
This suggests that state court experience-whatever its specific 
degree-is concentrated in constitutional rather than statutory 
law.86 Yet a fuller picture of state court experience with federal 
constitutional law can be had by looking at the specific 
86. These results are generally consistent with a small study of federal 
questions taken up in state supreme courts. See Meador, supra note 64. In that 
study, Professor Meador surveyed the civil and criminal opinions of seven state 
supreme courts in 1983 and found that well over ninety percent of the federal 
questions decided involved questions of constitutional rather than statutory 
law. Id. at 351. 
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constitutional questions it adjudicates in civil cases, which are 
presented in Table 11. 
Table 11: Constitutional Federal Questions Resolved in 
State Civil Opinions Published by States of the 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits87 
1991 2001 
Total % Total % 
Total civil constitutional 172 100 148 100 questions 
Bill of Attainder 1 0.6 1 0.7 
Confrontation Clause 0 0.0 1 0.7 
Contracts Clause 2 1.2 0 0.0 
Dormant Commerce Clause 2 1.2 2 1.4 
Double Jeopardy 1 0.6 2 1.4 
Eighth Amendment 0 0.0 2 1.4 
Equal Protection 17 9.9 20 13.5 
Ex Post Facto Clause 2 1.2 2 1.4 
First Amendment 17 9.9 15 10.1 
Fourth Amendment 6 3.5 2 1.4 
Full Faith and Credit 3 1.7 1 0.7 
Incrimination Clause 0 0.0 3 2.0 
Indian Commerce Clause 1 0.6 0 0.0 
Interstate Compact Clause 0 0.0 1 0.7 
Presentment Clause 1 0.6 0 0.0 
Procedural Due Process 84 48.8 65 43.9 
Seventh Amendment 5 2.9 0 0.0 
Sixth Amendment 3 1.7 0 0.0 
Substantive Due Process 5 2.9 5 3.4 
Supremacy Clause 10 5.8 14 9.5 
Takings 10 5.8 6 4.1 
Void for Vagueness 2 1.2 6 4.1 
87. Note that this table presents the number of constitutional federal 
questions, while Tables 7 and 8 presented the number of federal question 
opinions. Because many cases contained more than one constitutional question, 
the total constitutional federal questions in this Table differ from the total 
opinions containing constitutional federal questions. 
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Looking at Table 11, one sees that roughly seventy-five to eighty 
percent of the constitutional questions adjudicated in civil cases are 
confined to just five types of questions: equal protection claims, first 
amendment claims, procedural due process claims, supremacy 
claims, and takings claims. While the courts hear few civil cases in 
other areas, one must be careful not to conclude that they therefore 
have little experience in those areas. Due to state courts' criminal 
and habeas dockets, they have significant experience-perhaps 
experience even superior to federal courts-with claims under the 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. State courts also 
likely have additional experience in due process, equal protection, 
first amendment, and takings claims because many states have 
constitutional provisions on these subjects that mirror (or at least 
are interpreted as mirroring) the federal constitutional provisions.ss 
Thus, the picture that emerges with respect to state courts' 
experience in the area of constitutional law is this: state courts 
likely have fairly significant experience with federal questions 
predicated on the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
have much less experience with questions predicated on the main 
body of the constitution or certain amendments (such as the Ninth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Amendments). Or, to put it a bit differently, 
state courts likely have significant experience adjudicating certain 
categories of individual rights claims, but very little experience 
adjudicating questions of federalism and constitutional structure. 
To be sure, this generalization does not hold true in all specific 
instances,s9 but on the whole, it is more correct than not. 
A much different picture, however, is painted by state court 
interpretation of federal statutes. Unlike the constitutional 
questions often adjudicated in state court, statutory questions are 
much more variegated. Moreover, state courts have no alternate 
way to develop experience in these areas of law, as they do in 
constitutional cases due to their criminal and habeas dockets and 
analogous state constitutional provisions. Consider Tables 12 and 
13, infra. 
88. See generally GARDNER, supra note 44. 
89. For instance, state courts seem to decide more Supremacy Clause 
issues-which are structural issues-than substantive due process issues-
which concern individual rights. 
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Table 12: Statutory Federal Questions Resolved in State 
Civil Opinions Published by States of the 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits (1991) 
Statute Total % 
Total statutory federal questions 83 100 
42 u.s.c. § 1983 16 19.3 
Bankruptcy Act 15 18.1 
Federal Employees Liability Act 4 4.8 
Indian Child Welfare Act 4 4.8 
Farm Credit Act 4 4.8 
Fair Labor Standards Act 3 3.6 
42 u.s.c. § 1985 3 3.6 
42 u.s.c. § 1988 3 3.6 
5 u.s.c. §§ 8336-38 3 3.6 
Social Security Act 2 2.4 
National Labor Relations Act 2 2.4 
Consumer Credit Protection Act 2 2.4 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 2 2.4 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 2 2.4 
ERISA 1 1.2 
Uniformed Serv. Fmr. Spouses Prot. Act 1 1.2 
Labor Management Relations Act 1 1.2 
Truth in Lending Act 1 1.2 
Railway Labor Act 1 1.2 
Patent Jurisdiction 1 1.2 
Clayton Act 1 1.2 
28 u.s.c. § 1447 1 1.2 
30 u.s.c. § 29 1 1.2 
Federal Land Policy Act 1 1.2 
Mineral Lands Leasing Act 1 1.2 
Vocational Rehabilitation Act 1 1.2 
General Allotment Act 1 1.2 
25 u.s.c. § 261-64 1 1.2 
Food Stamp Act 1 1.2 
Fed. Property & Admin. Servs. Act 1 1.2 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act 1 1.2 
Federal Credit Union Act 1 1.2 
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Table 13: Statutory Federal Questions Resolved in State 
Civil Opinions Published by States of the 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits (2001) 
Statute Total % 
Total statutory federal questions 63 100 
Indian Child Welfare Act 11 17.5 
42 u.s.c. § 1983 5 7.9 
Bankruptcy Act 5 7.9 
Social Security Act 3 4.8 
Labor Management Relations Act 3 4.8 
Healthcare Quality Improvement Act 3 4.8 
National Labor Relations Act 3 4.8 
ERISA 2 3.2 
Fair Labor Standards Act 2 3.2 
Federal Arbitration Act 2 3.2 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 2 3.2 
18 u.s.c. § 1151 2 3.2 
Communications Act of 1934 2 3.2 
Title VII 1 1.6 
Americans with Disabilities Act 1 1.6 
Gun Control Act 1 1.6 
ICC Termination Act 1 1.6 
Uniformed Serv. Fmr. Spouses Prot. Act 1 1.6 
Rehabilitation Act 1 1.6 
National Trails System Act 1 1.6 
Columbia River Gorge ... Mgmt. Plan 1 1.6 
Federal Railroad Safety Act 1 1.6 
28 U.S.C. § 1333 1 1.6 
Food Security Act 1 1.6 
Immigration Reform and Control Act 1 1.6 
Emerg. Medical Trmt. & Active Lab. Act 1 1.6 
Communications Decency Act 1 1.6 
Full Faith & Cred. Child Supp. Or. Act 1 1.6 
Title VI 1 1.6 
42 U.S.C. § 1988 1 1.6 
10 u.s.c. § 1408 1 1.6 
Unlike the constitutional questions heard in state courts (which 
were mostly confined to five types of claims), federal statutory 
questions are not concentrated in any particular area. The only 
questions appearing with any regularity involve § 1983, the 
Bankruptcy Act, and the Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA"). The 
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Bankruptcy Act, and ICWA cases-which comprise about a quarter 
of the statutory questions-are unimportant for the present 
analysis, however. Litigants wishing to file for bankruptcy must do 
so in federal court.90 Thus, although state courts may have 
experience in a particular portion of the bankruptcy code,91 that 
experience is not "available" to a claimant choosing between state 
and federal court. Similarly, the ICWA regulates child custody 
disputes involving Native Americans that are filed in state courts.92 
Thus, this question-though federal in nature-is in practice an 
insufficient predicate for federal question jurisdiction. 
With these cases put aside, one sees that state court experience 
with federal statutes is highly limited. State courts hear only a 
scattering of claims based on federal legislation. While 
approximately thirty different statutes appeared in state opinions in 
1991 and 2001 respectively, the number of adjudications per statute 
was little more than token. Roughly seventy-five percent of the 
statutes were adjudicated only one or two times in over fifteen 
states. And only one statute (42 U.S.C. § 1983) was ever addressed 
more than ten times during both 1991 and 1992.93 Thus, state court 
experience with federal legislation appears to be highly limited. 
In sum, while state courts likely have significant experience 
adjudicating certain types of federal individual rights claims, they 
have little experience on the whole with federal law. This lack of 
experience is particularly extreme in the field of federal statutes. 
The Article now turns to the question of whether federal courts will 
likely be more solicitous of federal claims than state courts. 
V. SOLICITUDE 
Another belief that animates federal question jurisdiction is the 
belief that federal courts are likely to be more "solicit[ous]" of federal 
90. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings. 
28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2000). 
91. State cases involving the Bankruptcy Act typically involve questions of 
whether state judgments assessing fines against a bankruptcy petition violate 
the Act's automatic stay on all subsequent actions against the debtor. See, e.g., 
Miller v. Nat'l Franchise Servs., 807 P.2d 1139 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) 
(considering whether automatic stay entered by federal bankruptcy court 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 prohibits garnishment of debtor's salary). 
92. See 25 U.S.C. § 19ll(a) (2000). 
93. While the Bankruptcy Act and Indian Child Welfare Act were each 
adjudicated more than ten times on one occasion, as noted above, such statutes 
are relatively unhelpful in assessing state court experience. See supra notes 90-
92 and accompanying text. 
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claims than state courts.94 Put differently, this belief contends that 
federal courts somehow care more than state courts about federal 
claims, or conversely, that state courts care less about federal 
claims.95 This section inquires into whether this belief is justified. 
Looking to the research and scholarship in this area, one sees that, 
in some instances, there are reasons to believe that federal courts do 
care more about federal claims. In other instances, however, such 
reasons are absent. Given this state of affairs, an answer to the 
solicitude question necessarily rests on how well the two bodies of 
evidence can be aggregated and weighed against each other. As 
explained below, it is unlikely that, given the current state of 
knowledge in this field, this task will be attainable. It follows that 
the presumption of federal solicitude is not justified as a purpose of 
federal question jurisdiction. This is not to say that research into 
solicitude (or parity more generally) has not been productive or 
should not continue. Such research has tremendous value to a 
broad variety of questions facing judges, legislators, and court 
administrators. My point here is simply that, given the current 
state of knowledge on this subject, it is impossible at this point to 
justify a system-wide presumption that federal courts are preferable 
to state courts for plaintiffs advancing federal claims. 
94. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 545 U.S. 
308, 312 (2005). 
95. While it is tempting to conclude that "solicitude" is simply an alternate 
expression for the supposed lack of parity between state and federal courts, this 
conclusion would be much too facile. As is well known in the federal courts 
field, the parity debate is chiefly animated by three issues: technical 
competence, psychological set, and susceptibility to majoritarian pressures. 
Given that this conception of the debate includes the issue "technical 
competence," it is clear that any reference to federal "solicitude" should not be 
understood to generally refer to the alleged lack of parity between the state and 
federal courts. As explained supra Part II, the common beliefs justifying federal 
question jurisdiction include uniformity, solicitude, and expertise. If solicitude 
referred to parity in general, it would render the expertise factor irrelevant. 
While this may seem like an overly literal reading of recent Supreme Court 
precedent, the view aligns closely with history. At the outset of the republic, 
Hamilton defended federal jurisdiction as a necessary protection from state 
hostility. Of course, as there was no such thing as an Article III judge when 
Hamilton spoke, and no such thing as general federal question jurisdiction until 
1875, it is practically impossible to read expertise into the historical defenses of 
federal question jurisdiction. Indeed, it was not until the mid-twentieth century 
that commentators came to agree that "federal courts have acquired a 
considerable expertness in the interpretation and application of federal law, ... 
most noticeabl[y] with regard to what are called 'federal specialties,'" such as 
"bankruptcy and federal antitrust litigation." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra 
note 3, at 164-65. 
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The argument in favor of federal solicitude is built chiefly on 
two institutional characteristics of the federal courts.96 First, federal 
judges, as compared to state judges, are "insulated from 
majoritarian pressures" and second, federal judges possess a 
"psychological set" making them more likely than state judges to 
uphold federal claims.97 Each of these points is discussed separately 
below. 
A. Majoritarian Pressures 
Federal judges are thought to be more solicitous of federal 
claims in part because they, as a practical matter, have life tenure. 
State judges, in contrast, are often subject to election.98 From this 
observation flows the inference that federal judges are more 
insulated from "majoritarian pressures" and are therefore freer to 
rule in favor of political minorities (who are often advancing 
constitutional claims).99 Were this a complete and accurate picture 
of federal and state judicial institutions, as well as the behavior of 
the electorate, this inference might be justified. 
It is not such a picture, however. To begin with, the claim that 
state judges are beholden to majoritarian pressures "rests, in part, 
on the assumptions that judicial elections are based on evaluations 
of how judges decide cases; that state court judges recognize this (or 
fear it) and are influenced in their decisionmaking by future 
electoral review; and that federal judges are not affected by the 
same public sentiments."100 This has not been proven, however, and 
96. Many prominent scholars base their belief in federal "solicitude" on 
these arguments. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND 
REFORM 172 (1985) (stating that "systematically different conditions of 
employment" between state and federal judges permit one to infer that federal 
courts are preferable to state courts in advancing civil rights claims); Burt 
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1122-27 (1977); Martin 
H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment 
on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329, 333 
(1988) (noting that an "inescapable logical inference" makes federal courts 
preferable to state courts with respect to civil rights claims). 
97. Neuborne, supra note 96, at 1120, 1127. 
98. Id. at 1127-28. This observation was truer at the time Professor 
Neuborne made it than it is today. See Michael E. Solimine, The Future of 
Parity, 46 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1457, 1491-94 (2005) (noting electoral reforms in 
state judiciaries). 
99. For a summary of state judicial selection methods, see Mark A. Behrens 
& Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection Systems 
for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL 'y 273, 314-60 (2002). 
100. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Courts, State Courts, and the 
Constitution: A Rejoinder to Professor Redish, 36 UCLA L. REV. 369, 372 (1988). 
2007] REASSESSING FEDERAL JURISDICTION 289 
has even been disproven in at least one instance.101 Yet, even if it 
were, the inference would only hold true for the thirty-nine states 
that actually use elections to choose judges.102 Moreover, even 
within those thirty-nine states, it is not likely to hold true to the 
same degree. Some states elect their supreme court judges but 
appoint lower court judges, while other states elect all of their 
judges. 103 Sometimes, the method of choosing judges differs even 
within a single court. In the Kansas trial courts, for example, the 
governor appoints some judges while the electorate chooses others.104 
Not only do states differ in their use of elections, but they differ 
considerably in their election methods. For example, some states 
hold partisan elections while others hold nonpartisan elections and 
still others hold retention elections after initial appointments. 105 
In light of this picture of state judicial selection methods, one 
must doubt whether a single inference can be safely drawn about 
majoritarian pressures on state judges. While one might be able to 
infer pressure or lack of pressure for a particular state, it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to aggregate the huge number of inferences-some 
of which are at odds with empirical evidence-necessary to adopt a 
single federal position on the matter. Thus, a system-wide belief 
that federal courts are, on the whole, more solicitous of federal 
claims is unmerited on this point. 
101. For example, in a study of federal constitutional claims related to gay 
rights, Daniel Pinello found that state elected judges sided with gay rights 
claimants more often than appointed judges, and that all state judges, on 
average, sided with the gay rights claimant more that federal judges. See 
DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 110-17 (2003). For another 
empirical study involving gay rights, see William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of 
Superiority, 16 CONST. COMM. 599, 599-600 (1999) (concluding that states may 
be as or more hospitable to gay rights than federal courts). 
One notable study suggesting electoral pressures are important is Paul 
R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, 
Context, and Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. POL. 1206 (1997). In 
this project, the authors studied death penalty decisions and concluded that 
"selection procedures systematically influence, in the long term, the overall 
predispositions of those who occupy the bench." Id. at 1207. While this an 
important data point, it is insufficient to justify a system-wide belief in state 
majoritarian pressures. Death penalty cases are often highly publicized and 
important to the public, and thus differ from the great majority of federal 
claims heard in state and federal courts. 
102. Behrens & Silverman, supra note 99, at 314-60 (collecting judicial 
selection methods for each state and the District of Columbia). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 329. 
105. For a complete summary of state judicial selection methods, see id. at 
314-60. 
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B. Psychological Set 
The second institutional characteristic allegedly demonstrating 
federal solicitude is the federal courts' "psychological set" favoring 
the enforcement of constitutional rights. 106 This psychological set 
allegedly flows from federal judges' (1) recognition that they are 
"heirs of a tradition of constitutional enforcement,'' (2) greater 
kinship with the Supreme Court and its mission, and (3) "ivory 
tower" mentality that allows them to recognize the primacy of rights 
without the pressure and emotions attending many state trials. 107 
As with the "majoritarian pressure" claim, were this "psychological 
set" claim based on an accurate picture of federal judges (and by 
implication, state judges), then one might be justified in believing 
that the entire federal judiciary, on the whole, would have greater 
solicitude for federal claims than state courts. Yet, as with the 
"majoritarian pressure" claim, this claim also proves too strong for 
the tenuous state of the evidence on this subject. 
To be sure, some federal judges undoubtedly possess such a 
psychological set. There is little evidence, however, that the 
psychological set extends across the majority of the federal bench 
and applies to the majority of federal claims. Yet, even if the 
mindset was pervasive and consistent throughout the federal courts, 
it is not clear that such a set necessarily favors federal claims in 
comparison to state court adjudication. In fact, there is at least 
some evidence suggesting the contrary. For example, in a study of 
eighty-six federal and 307 state court decisions on gay rights claims, 
Daniel Pinello concluded that when "adjudicating federal 
constitutional issues . . . state tribunals resolved lesbian and gay 
rights claims 56.3% more positively than federal courts."108 Another 
scholar who has studied litigation of gay rights in state and federal 
court has opined that state court solicitude for such rights may stem 
from the state courts' own psychological set, one developed among 
judges "who more regularly interact professionally with gay 
people."109 Whether one buys these claims or not, these studies 
nonetheless suggest the psychological set of judges-even if it could 
be generalized into a single "set" applicable to the majority of 
judges-likely applies to different cases in different ways. 
For example, what psychological set would a plaintiff advancing 
claims under the Takings Clause prefer? Such claims typically pit 
the rights of an individual against the needs of a community. As 
putative "heirs of a tradition of constitutional enforcement,'' federal 
106. Neuborne, supra note 96, at 1124. 
107. Id. at 1124-27. 
108. PINELLO, supra note 101, at 110. 
109. Rubenstein, supra note 101, at 615. 
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judges certainly recognize that the Constitution enshrines both the 
tradition of individual rights (by requiring, inter alia, "due process of 
law" and "just compensation") and community needs (by providing 
for, inter alia, eminent domain). no It is not clear that federal judges, 
even if "heirs of a tradition of constitutional enforcement"-a 
tradition from which state courts are presumably excluded-would 
rule more often in one way or another. In fact, this is what one 
scholar found in a study of Takings Clause cases adjudicated in 
state and federal courts. 111 In his view, the judicial analyses in state 
and federal courts "are startling in their similarity" and cast doubt 
on the assumptions that federal courts will decide cases differently, 
on takings claims at least. n2 
Of course, gay rights and Takings Clause claims are just two of 
many hundreds, if not thousands, of possible federal claims. It is 
quite possible that a federal psychological set makes a difference in 
other types of cases. Yet these examples were not meant to question 
the substantive claim that a psychological set exists (certainly some 
type of common psychological set exists among federal judges, even 
if quite thin), but rather to question the notion that a single 
psychological set predicts, on average, federal solicitude for federal 
claims. There are simply too many claims and too many contexts 
surrounding each claim to conclude that, on the whole, federal 
claimants will benefit from a psychological set present on the federal 
bench. To reiterate, I do not argue that such a set does not exist; 
rather, I only argue that the kaleidoscopic variety of claims and 
interests arising under federal law make it exceedingly difficult-if 
not impossible-to generalize as to the solicitude of federal courts 
for all federal claims. 
Thus, as a distinguished empirical scholar in the field recently 
admitted, "none of the empirical literature on parity is, or purports 
to be, even remotely definitive."na Without such definitiveness, it is 
improper to presume that federal solicitude is at work in federal 
adjudication and therefore a valid purpose of federal question 
jurisdiction. This Article now turns to a purpose of the jurisdictional 
grant rarely recognized by scholars in this field: the protection of 
certain federal sovereignty interests. 
110. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
111. Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of 
State and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, 23 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL 'y 233 (1999). 
112. Id. at 285. 
113. See Solimine, supra note 98, at 1469. 
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VI. SOVEREIGNTY 
Under the classic conceptions of sovereignty, a sovereign has 
the implicit authority to determine the rules of the territory over 
which it is sovereign. 114 If the sovereign chooses a system of 
government that relies on judicial interpretation of that sovereign's 
law, the sovereign has a keen interest in (1) having the opportunity 
to craft its own law through adjudication and (2) appearing as a 
party before its own courts rather than the courts of some other 
sovereign. AB explained below, statutory federal question 
jurisdiction serves the first, but not the second, sovereignty 
interest. 115 
Lawmaking Interests. Under the United States Constitution, 
Congress has the primary authority to make law. Because the 
judiciary adheres to a principle of stare decisis, however, judicial 
interpretation of federal law-whether by state or federal courts-
has the effect of law. The federal government, therefore, has a 
strong interest in having the opportunity to adjudicate questions of 
federal law. Without this opportunity, state courts would 
essentially control the meaning of federal law. 116 
114. The classic conceptions of sovereignty stem from the writings of 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. See Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2032-35 (2003). 
115. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1964) 
(noting the state courts' role as the "final expositors of state law" and the 
"primacy of the federal judiciary in deciding questions of federal law"); 
Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 3, at 80-81 (noting the role of federal courts 
in serving sovereignty interests); Friedman, supra note 3, at 1242 ("A 
sovereign's interest in ... defining the laws and rules that govern [its] society, 
seeing that those laws and rules are obeyed, and punishing those who 
transgress them . . . is a quintessential aspect of sovereignty."); Martin H. 
Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and 
Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles," 78 VA. L. 
REV. 1769, 1774 (1992) (stating that "it makes practical sense for a sovereign's 
courts to have primary responsibility for adjudication of that sovereign's law"). 
116. While the federal government would still maintain the ability to review 
state court decisions through the U.S. Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, 
see 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000), it would be virtually impossible for the Supreme 
Court to meaningfully superintend the meaning of federal law on its own. For 
discussions of the Supreme Court's modern docket and monitoring abilities, see 
Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court's 
Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 743 (2001) (noting the Court's 
decrease in docket size from about 150 cases prior to the 1980s to between 
seventy-six and ninety-two currently) and Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning 
Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges' Bill, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1704-13 (2000) (noting the plenary discretion afforded to 
the Supreme Court to decline appellate jurisdiction). While Professor Solimine 
recently observed that "available evidence seems to indicate that the Supreme 
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Using § 1331, litigants file approximately 140,000 federal 
question cases each year. 117 Of course, only a portion of these yield 
judicial opinions by district or appellate courts that become positive 
law, 118 but without this jurisdictional grant, the federal courts would 
have only limited opportunities to rule on federal questions.119 Thus, 
§ 1331 is the main avenue through which the federal government 
can control the content of its own laws. This is far from shocking, of 
course, but it is repeatedly ignored in assessing the purposes of 
federal question jurisdiction. 120 
Litigant Interests. A different situation is presented, however, 
with the federal government's interest as a party to litigation. 
Under this type of sovereignty interest, the federal government has 
an interest in suing and being sued in its own courts. While this is a 
preeminent interest of a sovereign, the question here is whether 
statutory federal question jurisdiction serves this interest. 
The answer is no. Several statutes other than§ 1331 grant the 
federal courts jurisdiction over cases where the federal government 
is a litigant. For instance § 1345 grants "district courts ... original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by 
the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof authorized to 
sue by Act of Congress."121 Similarly, both § 1346 and § 1441(b) 
guarantee the federal government, its agencies and officers access to 
Court has been able, to a tolerable degree, to carry out the monitoring function 
[of state courts]," such evidence says little about the Supreme Court's ability to 
monitor state courts in a world without statutory federal question jurisdiction. 
See Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the 
Twenty-first Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 359 (2002). 
117. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Table 4.8: U.S. District Courts, Civil 
Cases Filed by Jurisdiction, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfacts 
figures/Table408.pdf (listing number of cases filed under § 1331 for past six 
years, which ranged from 138,441 to 165,241). 
118. According to a study of over 1600 state and federal cases, only twenty 
percent remained in the judicial system long enough to be resolved on the 
merits either by pretrial motion or a trial on the merits. Herbert M. Kritzer, 
Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 163 
(1986). 
119. Federal courts also have jurisdiction over civil cases where the U.S. 
government is a party. These cases, however, are much less numerous 
(approximately 55,000) and are typically limited to specific areas of law. See 
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Table 4.8: U.S. District Courts, Civil Cases 
Filed by Jurisdiction, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/ 
Table408.pdf (listing number of cases filed in federal court in which U.S. 
government was a party). Moreover, many cases-such as those involving the 
Federal Tort Claims Act-require federal courts to apply state law. See 28 
u.s.c. § 2674 (2000). 
120. See supra note 3. 
121. 28 u.s.c. § 1345 (2000). 
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a federal forum if sued. 122 Beyond jurisdiction in the district courts, 
litigant interests are broadly protected by the Court of Federal 
Claims, which, generally speaking, has jurisdiction over non-tort 
suits for money damages against the United States government.123 
In addition to these jurisdictional provisions, numerous other 
statutes guarantee the federal government access to a federal 
forum. 124 Thus, while the federal government clearly has an interest 
in suing or being sued in a federal forum, many statutes other than 
§ 1331 accomplish this goal. 
Still, one could argue that such statutes are duplicative of 
§ 1331 and that § 1331 alone could serve this interest. After all, 
many federal statutes, such as the Civil Rights Act and RICO 
statute, contain jurisdictional provisions that are duplicative of § 
1331.125 Moreover, the Supreme Court has clearly held that a case 
"arises under" federal law for the purposes of Article III if the 
federal government is a party to the action.126 This ignores, 
however, that the Court has interpreted § 133l's "arising under" 
clause much more narrowly than the Article III clause.127 Under this 
122. Id. §§ 1346, 1441(b). 
123. Id. § 1491. 
124. See, e.g., id. § 134 7 (granting district courts jurisdiction over a partition 
action where the United States is a joint tenant); id. § 1348 (granting district 
courts jurisdiction over cases involving corporations organized under an Act of 
Congress where the United States owns more than half the corporation's capital 
stock); id. § 1355 (granting district courts jurisdiction to enforce "any fine, 
penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, incurred under any Act of 
Congress"); id. § 1357 (granting district courts jurisdiction for "injury to person 
or property on account of any act done by him, under any Act of Congress, for 
the protection or collection of revenues, or to enforce the right of citizens of the 
United States to vote in any state"); id. § 1358 (granting district courts 
jurisdiction over "all proceedings to condemn real estate for the use of the 
United States or its departments or agencies"); id. § 1361 (granting district 
courts jurisdiction over "any action in the nature of a mandamus to compel an 
officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty 
owed to the plaintiff''); id. § 1444 (permitting the United States to remove a 
state court foreclosure action to federal court). 
125. See supra note 7 (noting redundant jurisdictional statutes). 
126. See Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 811 
(1824). 
127. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1983) 
("Although the language of § 1331 parallels that of the 'arising Under' [sic] 
clause of Art III, this Court never has held that statutory 'arising under' 
jurisdiction is identical to Art III 'arising under' jurisdiction."). See generally 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at § 5.2 at 266-67 (addressing the distinction 
between jurisdiction under Article III and under § 1331). For excellent 
historical accounts of the statutory grant of jurisdiction, see James H. 
Chadbourne & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. 
PA. L. REV. 639 (1942) and Ray Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," 
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narrower understanding, a case whose federal nature stems only 
from the United States' status as a party would not fall within the 
"arising under" jurisdiction of § 1331.128 Thus, if statutory federal 
question jurisdiction were abolished, the federal government's 
litigant interests would not be harmed at all. 
As explained above in the preceding Parts, federal question 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 serves two particular purposes. 
It provides litigants with access to judges likely to be experienced in 
federal law (particularly in statutory form) and it allows the federal 
government to control the meaning of federal law. With these two 
purposes presented, the Article now turns to another purpose that 
might be attributed to the jurisdictional grant but is nonetheless not 
proven by empirical evidence. 
VII. CASELOAD 
It is tempting to think that, in addition to the purposes 
explained above, federal question jurisdiction also shoulders a large 
caseload burden. Without federal question jurisdiction, the 
argument goes, state courts would be besieged by an avalanche of 
federal claims. When one looks more closely at the data, however, 
this claim is not borne out. 
In 2003, 142,591 cases were filed in federal court pursuant to 
federal question jurisdiction.129 In that same year, litigants filed 
100.1 million cases in state courts. 130 If federal question jurisdiction 
were abolished and the state courts had to absorb 142,591 federal 
question cases, the caseload of the state courts would increase only a 
tiny 0.14%. Yet, it is likely improper to use the states' total 
caseload, since it undoubtedly includes many small cases such as 
traffic court cases and small claims court cases, which require 
significantly fewer judicial resources to adjudicate. To better assess 
the marginal burden that federal question cases would impose, one 
16 TUL. L. REV. 362, 374-77 (1942). 
128. One exception to this would be in the field of government contracts. In 
resolving contract disputes in which the U.S. government is a party, courts 
typically apply federal common law, which is a sufficient hook for federal 
question jurisdiction under§ 1331. See, e.g., Almond v. Capital Props., Inc., 212 
F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000); Montana v. Abbot Labs., 266 F. Supp. 2d 250 (D. Mass. 
2003). 
129. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload 
Statistics, Table C-2 (Mar. 31, 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2005/ 
contents.html. 
130. Richard Y. Schauffier et al., Examining the Work of State Courts, 2004: 
A National Perspective from the Court Statistics Project, at 14 (2005), available 
at http://www.ncsconline.org/d_research/CSP/2004_Files/EW2004_Main_Page. 
html. 
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must consider the specific types of cases adjudicated in state courts. 








Table 14: Total Incoming Cases in 
State Courts in 2003 (in millions)131 








Looking at Table 14, one immediately sees that limited 
jurisdiction cases account for the great majority of state cases. 
While these are not always small in size (a divorce case in a limited 
jurisdiction family court, for example, may require significant court 
resources to resolve), it is likely that most cases in these courts are 
small. Similarly, some cases in the courts of general or unified 
jurisdiction-such as traffic cases-do not individually impose large 
burdens on the state courts. A better picture of state caseloads (for 
the purposes of this Article, at least) would include all non-traffic 
cases in courts of unified or general jurisdiction-which number 19.3 
million. Using that value, an addition of 142,591 federal question 
cases would only increase state caseloads by a negligible 0.7%. 
Certainly, if faced with the task of absorbing the federal courts' 
federal question docket, state judges and court administrators would 
claim that state courts do not have the capacity to absorb even a 
0. 7% increase in caseload. This may well be correct, but it does not 
mean that federal question jurisdiction therefore shoulders a huge 
caseload burden. It might suggest, however, that federal question 
jurisdiction therefore provides federal claimants with a forum that 
will review their claims more quickly than alternative fora. While 
there is certainly something to this (federal courts do tend to dispose 
of cases more quickly than state courts), the difference in case 
processing time is not so substantial that it rises to the level of a 
specific purpose accomplished by federal question jurisdiction.132 
131. Id. 
132. According to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, federal 
district courts disposed of civil cases, on average, in 8.4 months from time of 
filing. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload 
Statistics, Time Intervals From Filing to Disposition of Civil Cases Terminated, 
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Moreover, even if one recognized this as a limited purpose of the 
jurisdictional grant, it would not be useful in deciding jurisdictional 
questions. While different cases will implicate experience and 
control interests to different degrees, all cases will implicate the 
expediency issue to the same degree. That is, regardless of the 
subject matter of a case or the federal law involved, federal courts 
assessing their jurisdiction will always be justified in assuming that 
federal adjudication will proceed somewhat more quickly than state 
courts in adjudicating the claim. Thus, the expediency factor-
though perhaps enlightening in general-does little to help courts 
actually determine the contours of federal jurisdiction. 
VIII. EXPERIENCE AND CONTROL IN PRACTICE 
Replacing the "uniformity-solicitude-experience" regime with an 
"experience-control" regime has important implications for many 
federal question doctrines, particularly those that are explicitly 
based on the traditional purposes. 133 While the chief purpose of this 
Article has been simply to adduce the empirical evidence on the 
jurisdictional grant rather than explore its doctrinal implications, a 
short exploration of one area of law will illustrate the potential 
import of this evidence. Thus, this Article briefly discusses the 
doctrines of concurrent jurisdiction, exclusive federal jurisdiction, 
by District and Method of Disposition, at 54, Table C-5 (2004), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/tables/C05Mar04. pdf. According to a 
study of thirty-nine urban trial courts across the country, state courts disposed 
of civil cases, on average, in 417 days--or 13.9 months-from the time of filing. 
See John A. Goerdt et al., Reexamining the Pace of Litigation in 39 Urban Trial 
Courts, at 39, Table 3.2 (1991), http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ 
KIS_ CasManReexamPaceLitig. pdf. 
133. Other than concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction, which are discussed 
in this part, the shift in purposes identified in this Article will certainly be 
relevant to three particular subjects in federal jurisdiction: the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, federal jurisdiction under counterclaims, and substantial 
federal question jurisdiction. Each of these subjects has been debated in terms 
of the traditional purposes of federal question jurisdiction and the new purposes 
identified in this Article offer a new perspective on the debate. See Doernberg, 
supra note 11 (claiming that the well-pleaded complaint rule contradicts the 
traditional purposes of the federal question jurisdiction); John F. Preis, 
Jurisdiction and Discretion in Hybrid Law Cases, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 145 (2006) 
(using the traditional purposes of federal question jurisdiction to assess the 
appropriate jurisdictional rule to govern substantial federal question cases); 
Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift On a Sea of Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity 
in Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal Circuit, 92 GEO 
L.J. 523 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court decision Holmes Group, Inc. v. 
Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002), which held that 
counterclaims containing a federal question cannot provide a basis for federal 
question jurisdiction, will injure the uniformity of patent law). 
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and exclusive state jurisdiction. 
Under the Supreme Court's view, "nothing in the concept of our 
federal system prevents state courts from enforcing rights created 
by federal law."134 Thus, there is a "deeply rooted presumption in 
favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction."135 This presumption, 
however, has been criticized as contradicting the traditional 
purposes of federal question jurisdiction. That is, a presumption of 
concurrent jurisdiction causes numerous meaningful federal 
questions to end up in state court, where they will injure the 
uniformity of federal law. 136 In light of the evidence presented in 
this Article, however, the criticisms are misplaced and the doctrine 
is entirely justified. State court adjudications of federal law have 
little effect on its uniformity because legal questions are extremely 
close-ended, state courts typically follow narrow paths which tend to 
adhere to federal precedent, and state opinions that depart from 
settled views are highly unlikely to have significant precedential 
effect. Thus, contrary to views of many, concurrent jurisdiction is 
entirely unproblematic in the field of federal jurisdiction. 
Of course, although federal jurisdiction is presumed to be 
concurrent with the states, exclusive federal jurisdiction is 
warranted if the presumption is rebutted. Under Supreme Court 
precedent, one may rebut the presumption by showing "an explicit 
statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative 
history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction 
and federal interests."137 The first two grounds for rebutting the 
presumption in favor of concurrent jurisdiction are tied to 
Congress's prerogative to make federal jurisdiction exclusive while 
the third is tied to the judiciary's prerogative.138 Regardless of who 
134. Charles Dowd Box Co., Inc. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962). 
135. Taffiin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990). 
136. See Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 3, at 84. Other concerns, such 
as with state hostility or experience in federal law, are not implicated by 
concurrent jurisdiction because, if the case contains a substantial federal 
question, either party may choose to have the case heard in federal court. The 
plaintiff may file the case there in the first instance or the defendant may 
remove it there. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000). 
137. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981). 
138. Of course, it is eminently debatable whether the judiciary has any 
prerogative at all in this respect. Moreover, in a case decided soon after 
Taffiin-Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 498 U.S. 820 (1990)-the 
Supreme Court did not claim authority to craft exclusive jurisdiction doctrine 
on its own. Instead, it stated the exclusive jurisdiction turns solely on whether 
Congress "affirmatively divest(s] state courts of their presumptively concurrent 
jurisdiction." Id. at 823. Nonetheless, Gulf Offshore and Taffiin, which both 
claim judicial authority to craft jurisdiction under the "clear incompatibility" 
approach, are the more commonly cited and accepted authorities on the subject. 
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decides whether federal jurisdiction over a particular subject matter 
should be exclusive, however, the ultimate inquiry appears the 
same. Exclusive jurisdiction is warranted by "the desirability of 
uniform interpretation [of federal law], the expertise of federal 
judges in federal law, and the assumed greater hospitality of federal 
courts to peculiarly federal claims."139 In light of the principles upon 
which exclusive federal question jurisdiction has thus far been 
based, as well as the new principles identified in this Article, the 
question becomes: which grants of exclusive jurisdiction are justified 
and which areas of concurrent jurisdiction deserve exclusive 
jurisdictional status? 
Currently, several types of legal questions are heard only within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts: admiralty, 140 patent 
and copyright, 141 bankruptcy, 142 antitrust, 143 and federally regulated 
securities, 144 among others. 145 Viewed in light of the purposes of 
federal experience and the desire to control the content of federal 
law, as well as the reality that concurrent jurisdiction supplemented 
by the right of removal146 (rather than exclusive state jurisdiction) is 
the alternative, one sees that exclusive jurisdiction is never 
warranted. While federal courts no doubt have superior experience 
in these areas (especially because exclusive jurisdiction has divested 
139. Taffiin, 493 U.S. at 464 (citing Gulf Offshore Co., 453 U.S. at 483-84). 
While the quoted factors are from the Supreme Court's understanding of the 
"clear incompatibility'' inquiry, the policy decision undertaken by Congress 
admits of the same considerations. See Redish, supra note 116, at 1811 (noting 
that "[t]he most striking aspect of [the reasons advanced in favor of exclusive 
federal jurisdiction] is their similarity to the justifications generally given for 
the provision of general federal question jurisdiction in the first place"). 
140. 28 u.s.c. § 1333 (2000). 
141. Id. § 1338(a). 
142. Id. § 1334. 
143. See, e.g., Miller v. Granados, 529 F.2d 393, 395 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(concluding that federal courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over antitrust 
suits brought under the Sherman and Clayton Acts); Washington v. Am. League 
of Profl Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 1972) (same); Cream Top 
Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., Inc., 383 F.2d 358, 363 (6th Cir. 1967) (same). 
144. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000). 
145. Other less prominent areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction include 
maritime prize cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(2) (2000); suits against consuls or vice-
consuls, id. § 1351; suits for recovery or enforcement of civil fines, penalties or 
forfeitures under federal statutes, id. § 1355; suits seeking review of certain 
customs decisions, id. § 1581; quiet title actions against the United States, id. § 
2409(a); suits under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717u (2000); suits under 
the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C.S. § 3133(b)(3) (LEXIS through Sept. 2006 
amendments); and, state suits for violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 
U.S.C. § 13a-2(2) (2000). 
146. 28 u.s.c. § 1441 (2000). 
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the states of any experience), concurrent jurisdiction allows either 
party to bring the suit before an experienced federal tribunal. With 
respect to the federal government's interest in controlling the 
content of federal law, the evidence reveals that, while litigants may 
seek state court review of scores of different federal statutes, in 
practice they rarely do. Thus, opening up the state courts to 
subjects traditionally within the realm of exclusive federal 
jurisdiction is likely to have little effect on federal ability to control 
the meaning of federal law. 
Unlike concurrent or exclusive federal jurisdiction, exclusive 
state jurisdiction over federal law completely divests litigants of any 
opportunity to invoke any experience of a federal judge as well as 
divests the lower federal courts of any opportunity to control the 
content of federal law .147 Without concurrent jurisdiction, removal is 
impossible and thus will not preserve litigant interests in these 
circumstances. Yet on the whole, exclusive state jurisdiction is not 
troublesome. First, given that federal questions within the state 
courts' exclusive jurisdiction were placed there by Congress (rather 
than the judiciary), it is doubtful that the federal courts have any 
superior experience to bring to the matter. Moreover, some federal 
statutes in the state courts' exclusive jurisdiction concern subject 
matters over which they have traditionally exercised jurisdiction.148 
Second, although exclusive state jurisdiction divests the lower 
federal courts of control over federal law, it does not divest the 
Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction over state final 
judgments involving federal law. 149 While, as noted supra, the 
Supreme Court's ability to superintend state supreme court 
decisions is highly limited, 150 this ability is not so lame that it cannot 
address the relatively few federal laws within the state courts' 
exclusive jurisdiction. Were Congress to place more subject matters 
within this category of jurisdiction, however, federal control over 
federal law might suffer in significant ways. Were that to occur, 
federal question jurisdiction would be advisable. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
It is customary to conclude articles of this sort with a summary 
of the conclusions presented within it. As I trust such conclusions 
147. For examples of federal statutes that may only be enforced in state 
courts, see supra note 46. 
148. See Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000) (granting state 
courts exclusive jurisdiction over child custody matters involving Native 
American children). 
149. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000). 
150. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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have been sufficiently explained throughout, I instead close this 
Article with a short observation on the continuing need for empirical 
studies on the federal and state courts. It is somewhat amazing 
that, in an age when legal research has been hugely simplified by 
computers, so much doctrine in the realm of federal jurisdiction still 
rests on untested (albeit sometimes logical) suppositions. Time and 
again, the top scholars in this field have recognized that "[a] central 
task of the law of federal jurisdiction is allocating cases between 
state and federal courts."151 Yet to this day, there is surprisingly 
little evidence on what our allocation doctrines actually 
accomplish-that is, what types of cases actually appear in state 
and federal courts. This Article has attempted to make a small dent 
in this paucity of scholarship. To be sure, however, much more 
needs to be done. While those in academia are well-equipped at 
studying data, they are less able to gather data. Therefore, progress 
in this area will occur only with contributions by other institutions, 
such as the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and the 
National Center for State Courts. These institutions have 
contributed mightily thus far but have not always focused on data 
th~t have doctrinal relevance. A new focus on this area as well as 
increased effort by many academics will contribute much to the field 
in the coming years. 
151. Friedman, supra note 3, at 1216. 
*** 
